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Abstract
For fourteen years Australia has detained asylum seekers ar-
riving unlawfully in its territory. It also intercepts asylum
seekers arriving in the territorial waters, detaining them in
third countries and preventing them from seeking refugee
status in Australia (the “Pacific Solution”). This paper traces
the development of the policy, its current implementation,
the justification employed by the government for maintain-
ing it, and its legality under international law. On examina-
tion of these issues, it is evident that the justification for the
mandatory policy is flawed; that the costs of the policy – in
terms of the physical and mental well-being of asylum seek-
ers themselves, and the social and financial impact on the
Australian community – are too great, and it puts Australia
in breach of its obligations under international law. How-
ever, the government has not canvassed alternatives to the
mandatory detention policy and has no intention of chang-
ing it. This leaves asylum seekers who enter Australian terri-
tory unlawfully literally and figuratively between a “rock
and hard place.”
Résumé
Depuis 14 ans l’Australie a eu pour politique de détenir les
demandeurs d’asile qui arrivent illégalement sur son terri-
toire. Il intercepte aussi les demandeurs d’asile qui
pénètrent dans ses eaux territoriales, les détenant dans des
pays tiers et les empêchant de revendiquer le statut de
réfugié en Australie (la « solution du Pacifique », comme on
l’appelle). Cet article retrace le développement de cette poli-
tique, la manière dont elle est présentement mise en œuvre,
les raisons évoquées par le gouvernement pour justifier
son maintien, et sa légalité au regard du droit interna-
tional. Lorsqu’on examine ces questions de près, il
devient clair que la justification offerte pour cette poli-
tique obligatoire comporte des lacunes ; que les coûts
de la politique – en terme du bien-être physique et
mental des demandeurs d’asile, aussi bien qu’en terme
de l’impact social et financier sur la société austral-
ienne – sont trop élevés, et qu’elle place l’Australie en
position de violation de ses obligations vis-à-vis du
droit international. Cependant, le gouvernement n’a
pas exploré les alternatives possibles à la politique de
détention obligatoire et n’a aucunement l’intention de
la changer. Ainsi, les demandeurs d’asile qui entrent
illégalement sur le territoire australien se retrouvent
quasiment coincés.
Introduction
I
n Australia, freedom from arbitrary detention is a
fundamental right derived from the common law.1
Yet for fourteen years, Australia has enforced a policy
that requires any person who arrives or remains in Aus-
tralian territory unlawfully2 to be detained until either
any application for a visa is finalized3 or they are removed
from the country. Among those detained4 are asylum
seekers arriving unlawfully by boat and plane, and in-
clude many who have suffered torture and trauma, the
elderly, the sick, pregnant women, and children.5
In recent months there have been press reports of
detainees hunger striking, rioting, and committing acts

of self mutilation6 from frustration at being detained for long
periods in conditions that are increasingly recognized as sub-
standard by the Australian community.7 There has been stri-
dent criticism of the policy both nationally and internationally
– from Australia’s own Human Rights Commission, HREOC,
and other human rights and international organizations –
particularly concerning the detention of children.8
However, far from ameliorating the detention regime, the
government has significantly strengthened it – making it al-
most impossible for asylum seekers to obtain information
regarding their rights under Australian law so as to make
Protection Visa applications,9 to access legal advice, or to have
their detention reviewed by the courts. Simultaneously, access
to the detention centres by the media and members of the
general public is strictly limited.10
Furthermore, the government has now implemented a pol-
icy of detaining vessels carrying asylum seekers11 entering
Australian territorial waters, arresting the asylum seekers, and
deporting them to South Pacific nations (such as Nauru),12
where they are detained pending processing (the so-called
“Pacific Solution”).13 Since these places are outside Australia,
persons detained there have no right to apply for refugee status
under Australian law, no guarantee of proper processing, no
access to advice, and no appeal rights against adverse decisions
affecting them. These offshore detention centres are not easily
accessible to the press nor are they subject to independent
scrutiny by members of the Australian public.14
Currently, there is no other country which has such a strict
policy of  mandatory detention of all  those who enter the
country unlawfully regardless of their status or condition.
This paper shall examine the content of Australia’s deten-
tion policy: how it developed, how it is currently implemented,
its effects on asylum seekers, the justifications of government
in support of the policy, and its legality. Finally, there is a
discussion concerning the underlying rationale of the policy.
Mandatory Detention – Its Rise and Rise
The mandatory detention policy developed over twenty-five
years in conjunction with Australia’s policy towards onshore
refugee applicants. Australia’s migration laws are founded in
the Australian Constitution, which empowers the Common-
wealth Parliament to “make laws for the peace, order and good
government of Australia” with respect to, inter alia, “immigra-
tion and emigration,” “nationality and aliens,” and “external
affairs.”15 As interpreted by the High Court of Australia, this
authorizes the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate regard-
ing the treatment of “non-citizens,” including their admission,
stay, detention, and removal. Also relevant is the principle of
common law that “aliens”16 are not to be treated as “outlaws”
and should not be detained without proper authority conferred
by law.17
Australia’s policy towards unauthorized arrivals im-
mediately hardened when it became a country of first
asylum in the mid-1970s. From initially tightening entry
control and punishing those organizing the transport or
unlawful entry of people into Australian territory, by the
late 1980s the government began to direct its policy to
penalizing asylum seekers themselves, both as a means
of “deterrence” and for the protection of national secu-
rity. Essentially, Australia does not want to be a country
of first asylum but prefers to permit ingress to the coun-
try through an orderly system that it controls.18 This
blurring of policy imperatives between the need for na-
tional security on the one hand, and obligations owed
under international law on the other, has seen the latter
consistently subordinated to the former and has led to
the current policy of mandatory detention of asylum
seekers entering the country unlawfully.
Until the mid-1970s the arrival of asylum seekers was
exceptionally  rare  in Australia. There  was no  formal
system for assessing claims to refugee status at this time,
the grant of an entry permit being solely at the discretion
of the Minister under the then Section 6 of the Migration
Act.19 Resulting from the end of the Vietnam War and
the enforced economic isolation of Communist coun-
tries in Southeast Asia, large numbers of people began to
flee on boats to neighbouring countries. Australia sud-
denly found itself confronted by potential refugee appli-
cants as a country of first asylum.20 In response, Australia
instituted a more regularized system for the processing
of refugee claims,21 although the grant of refugee status
was still at the discretion of the Minister.22 There was no
“mandatory detention policy” as such for asylum seek-
ers; applicants were held in processing centres until iden-
tification checks and final assessment of their claims. If
granted refugee status, they would be given a temporary
or a permanent entry permit. If refugee status was re-
fused, they were removed.
After a further influx of ethnic Chinese being actively
“forced” from Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese
War in 1978–79, Australia instituted an organized mi-
gration scheme as part of an internationally agreed
plan.23 However, ongoing ethnic and economic prob-
lems in Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
bodia meant that the numbers fleeing quickly
outstripped the numbers allocated. Some countries re-
sponded in the early 1980s by refusing entry to the “boat
people.”24
In response  to the  arrival  of some two  thousand
people on boats in Australia in 1980, the government
amended the Migration Act, formally providing a legal
basis for the Minister’s discretionary assessment of refu-
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gee status according to the Refugees Convention and his power
to grant an entry permit.25 At the same time, the Immigration
(Unauthorised Arrivals) Act 1980 (Cth) (hereinafter IUA
Act)26 vastly increased the powers of Commonwealth officials
to board, search, and detain ships, and to arrest and detain
masters, owners, agents, and charterers of vessels, etc., in-
volved in the transportation of “unauthorized arrivals.”27 The
IUA Act also granted to Commonwealth officials the authority
either to grant a person who arrived in Australia aboard a
vessel (ship or airplane) without an entry permit issued pur-
suant to the Migration Act 1958 a permit to disembark the boat
or airplane on whatever conditions the officer determined,28
or to arrest such a person without warrant.29 The law required
that such a person, if arrested, be taken before a “prescribed
authority”30 within forty-eight hours of the initial arrest, or
within a period of time as was reasonably practicable thereaf-
ter.31 The prescribed authority could formally order in writing
the continued detention of that person where satisfied that the
arrest and subsequent detention of the individual were pursu-
ant to the IUA Act.32 A person the subject of such an order was
kept in detention until they were either conveyed from Aus-
tralia;33 or until they were granted an entry permit under the
Migration Act 1958,34 or until the Immigration Minister made
a declaration under s.10(2) of the IUA Act in respect of the
person that the Migration Act 1958 applied to them, in which
case they were to be taken to have entered Australia and hence
obtained the classification of “prohibited immigrant,” ena-
bling them to be deported from Australia.35 The Migration Act
authorized the removal of a detainee from Australia aboard
the vessel on which they had arrived,36 pursuant to which an
authorized Commonwealth officer could place the person
aboard the vessel and serve a direction on the Master or
Captain of that vessel to remove the person from Australia.
However, where the Minister had made a declaration under
s.11(1) of the IUA Act, but the Minister was not satisfied that
it would be practicable for the person to be removed from
Australia in accordance with this direction, the Minister was
required to order the release of the person.37 If the Minister
was satisfied that the “unauthorised arrival” in these circum-
stances was a refugee, the Minister could, via s.10(1) of the IUA
Act, utilize his discretionary power under s.6A(1)(c) of the
Migration Act 1958 to grant them an entry permit. Later, the
Migration Amendment Act 1983 (Cth)38 hardened penalties
for forgery of documents and for orchestrating illegal entry to
Australia, and facilitated the deportation of non-citizens from
Australia if they made no claims to refugee status or their
applications were rejected.39
After a lull in the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat
in the mid 1980s, by 1988–89 the number again rose sharply,
prompted by disturbances such as famine in Vietnam, the
ending of the Cold War, and events in China.40 ASEAN once
more called for an international conference to assist in
resolving the issue. The resulting International Confer-
ence on Indo-Chinese Refugees41 approved the Compre-
hensive Plan of Action (CPA).42 This required Vietnam
to prevent “illegal” departures in return for financial aid
and set out a time frame for the repatriation of those
asylum seekers from the camps in Southeast Asia who
were not positively assessed by the UNHCR for asylum.
But this action did not prevent increased numbers of
boats arriving in Australian waters – in some cases
caused, ironically, by the secondary flight of many fear-
ing the imminent closure of the camps and their forced
repatriation to their homelands.
It was from this time that the Australian government
manifested increasing hostility towards unauthorized
arrivals, implementing a policy of direct deterrence
based on mandatory detention.
The Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989
(Cth)43 strengthened border control44 and introduced a
form of mandatory detention as positive law.45 Section
14 of the Migration Act46 prescribed that a non-citizen
became an “illegal entrant”47 on entry to Australia unless
they held a valid entry permit, or their continued stay
was authorized under the Migration Act, or they had
departed at the expiry of their entry permit. The same
status was bestowed by s.20 of the Migration Act on any
person who had obtained entry to Australia fraudulently
or from false or forged documents. Under s.92 [s.38] of
the Migration Act a Commonwealth Officer had the
power to arrest an illegal entrant and to detain them in
custody until they made arrangements to leave Australia
voluntarily, or to detain them for a reasonable period to
enable consideration for the grant of an entry permit.
However, such detention was not to exceed seven days.
The Minister could authorize the release of an illegal
entrant from detention on whatever conditions he
deemed appropriate. However, where a deportation or-
der had been issued under the Migration Act, s.93(2)
[s.39(2)] empowered the Minister to order the contin-
ued detention of the illegal entrant until such time as
they were in fact deported.
More important to the development of the mandatory
detention policy of asylum seekers was section 88 [s.36]
of the Migration Act. This was intended to deal with the
small numbers of “prohibited entrants” such as stow-
aways found aboard seaborne vessels or those who
would become “illegal entrants” should they be allowed
to enter the country. Soon the section became the main
basis on which asylum seekers arriving by boat were
detained, since it was in force in 1989 when Australia
faced an increasing number of such boats which were
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intercepted in the territorial waters. Under its provisions
asylum seekers were detained until they were either granted an
entry permit to  enter Australia or were removed “expedi-
tiously” on the ships on which they came.48 A person detained
under this provision was deemed not to have entered Australia
for the purposes of the Migration Act. Increasingly, unlawful
arrivals were detained and were denied the procedural safe-
guards granted to non-citizens arriving lawfully and whose
entry permits later expired but who claimed protection. Asy-
lum seekers were hence being divided into two groups depend-
ing on their status on arrival.49
Those who became illegal entrants after expiry or cancella-
tion of a valid entry permit had a twenty-eight day “period of
grace” during which time they had to leave Australia or apply
for a further entry permit.50 If they were detained as a result of
being an illegal entrant, but then made arrangements to leave
voluntarily from Australia or applied for an entry permit
(including refugee status), they could be released from deten-
tion on conditions decided by the Minister until they departed
or until their application was finalized. If the application was
refused or they made no application to remain in Australia,
they would be deported following the expiry of any of the
“period of grace” that remained if they made no arrangements
to leave voluntarily within this time. If a person was detained
following the expiry of the “period of grace,” they could still
apply for refugee status (provided they had not been removed
from Australia in the interim) and again could be released on
whatever conditions the Minister saw fit until the application
was finalized.
By contrast, those prohibited entrants detained pursuant to
s.88 were kept in detention until they were either granted an
entry permit under s.47 [s.11ZD] of the Migration Act or they
were removed. As a result of this system, some asylum seekers
remained in detention for four years and more.51
The need for a legislative basis for the detention policy was
forced on the government in 1992 by an appeal to the High
Court: Chu Kheng Lim v. MILGEA (1992) 110 ALR 97.52 The
applicants sought injunctive and declaratory relief against
both the Minister and the Commonwealth of Australia on the
basis that they had exceeded their power by detaining the
applicants under s.88, and that a duty was owed to the appli-
cants under the Refugees Convention and/or the ICCPR.53
On 5 May 1992, two days before the case was scheduled for
hearing, the government pushed through Parliament the Mi-
gration Amendment Act 1992(Cth).54 This legalized the appli-
cants’ detention retrospectively. Nevertheless, five of the
judges observed in their decisions that were it not for the
amendment, s.88 could not be relied upon to detain the appli-
cants, especially since the Department’s own evidence was that
the boats on which the applicants arrived had in fact been
burned and ipso facto it was impossible for the detainees
to be returned on them as s.88 stipulated.55
The Migration Amendment Act 1992 inserted into the
principle Act Division 6 [Division 4B] which created a
new classification of “designated persons.”56 Sections
179, 181, and 183 [s.54L, 54N and 54P] required the
detention of a “designated person.” Under these provi-
sions, detention was limited to a period of 273 days.57
However, section 181 [s.54P] provided that the detainee
could obtain release by writing to the Minister and ask-
ing to be removed from Australia. Contingent with the
power to detain “designated persons,” s.183 [s.54R] pur-
ported to deny the courts the power to order the release
of a designated person from custody until their visa
applications were finalized.58
The Court in Lim rejected the claim by the applicants
that the amendment was introduced to prevent their
release and so operated as an usurpation of the judicial
power. The majority of the Court held that it completely
precluded the courts from reviewing the detention of
designated persons, but only where this detention was
not unlawful, i.e., where the detention of the person
concerned was not in accordance with the Migration
Act.59 The Court considered that the power to be released
lay ultimately in the hands of the detainee if they should
so wish under s.183 [s.54P]. In upholding these provi-
sions the Court noted that: “[T]he citizens of this coun-
try, at least in times of peace, enjoy a Constitutional
immunity from being imprisoned by Commonwealth
authority except pursuant to an order by a court in the
exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.”60
Crucially for the detention legislation, the Court held
that this privilege did not include “non-citizens” (i.e.,
aliens) and that their detention or expulsion was within
the legislative competence of the Commonwealth. The
Court accepted the government’s contention that the
detention of designated persons was not a punishment
but was to protect the national interest.61 This purpose
was clearly stated in s.176 [s.54J].62 The Court focused
on the use of the term “non-citizens” (i.e., “aliens”) in
the legislation, and in this regard the power was specifi-
cally granted to the Commonwealth by section 51(xix)
of the Constitution.63 This meant incidentally that the
Commonwealth also had the power to detain non-citi-
zens.64 Despite the fact that the Court stated it would
review detention of an individual toensure itwas according
to law, it was immediately apparent that, given the broad
definition of “designated persons,” it would be difficult to
envisage when detention would be unlawful.65
The Court’s decision in Lim essentially gave the green
light to the detention policy, permitting it to become
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entrenched as a tool of control and deterrence by successive
Australian governments.66
Current Detention Policy
The Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) (“the Reform Act”)67
introduced s.36(1) [s.26B] into the Migration Act and legislated
for the first time the Convention definition of a refugee into
domestic law.68 More importantly, the reforms removed the
legal distinction between “unauthorized arrivals” and “illegal
entrants” that had operated until then, replacing these with the
distinction between “non-citizens” who were “lawful” or “un-
lawful”69 but mandating the detention of all of the latter.70
According to the Migration Act, Division 7, s.189 an officer
must detain a person in the “migration zone”71 if the officer
knows or reasonably suspects that the person is an “unlawful
non-citizen.” This extends to a person who is outside the
migration zone and is seeking to enter it and would be an
unlawful non-citizen if they did so.72 Detention is also man-
dated for a person who is unable to supply proper documen-
tation or tries to avoid showing proper documentation that
they are a lawful non-citizen.73 A person can only be released
from detention under s.191 if they show evidence that they are
an Australian citizen, or produce evidence of being a lawful
non-citizen, or are granted a visa. A person whose visa has
been cancelled or who does not produce evidence of being a
lawful non-citizen will also be detained.74
Under the law, the period of detention is indeterminate.
Section 196(1) prescribes that an unlawful non-citizen de-
tained under s.189 must be kept in immigration detention
until they are: removed from Australia under s.198 or s.199
(for instance, after requesting the Minister in writing to be
removed  or upon any  outstanding visa applications being
finalized and refused); or deported (under ss 200–6); or
granted a visa. This is strengthened by s.196(3) which prohib-
its the release, even by a court, of an unlawful non-citizen from
detention (otherwise than for removal or deportation or un-
less they are granted a visa). Likewise, an unlawful non-citizen
who has not subsequently been immigration cleared must be
detained and removed from Australia as soon as reasonably
practicable where they have not applied for a substantive visa,
or the visa applied for is not one that can be granted when the
applicant is in the migration zone; or their application has
been finally determined.75 Removal also extends to the non-
citizen dependents of detainees, including spouses.76
Between the passage of the Reform Act 1992 through Par-
liament and its coming into force on 1 September 1994, several
recommendations were made to “ameliorate” the rigidity of
the system.77 The Minister was given the power to grant de-
tainees a bridging visa, thus permitting them to be released
pending a final decision on their Protection Visa application.78
Migration Regulations 1994 (hereinafter 1994 Regulations),
regulation 2.20 lists the prescribed classes of unlawful
non-citizens eligible for release. These include: people
detained under the law as it was before 1 September
1994;79 minors;80 the spouse of an Australian citizen or
permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen or a
member of that person’s family unit;81 elderly people,
i.e., aged seventy-five years and over;82 and people with
special medical needs, as determined by a medical officer
appointed by the Department.83 A detainee who does
not fit one of the prescribed classes may apply to the
Minister to grant a bridging visa in their favour.84 In
reality, however, these bridging visas are rarely granted.
HREOC reported in 1998 that only two children arriving
as boat people or born in detention had been released
out of a possible total of 581 since 1 September 1994.85
This system has undergone some modification in the
eight years of its operation, the government seeking to
make the detention regime as strict as possible. For
instance, under s.209 detainees are held liable to the
Commonwealth for the cost of their detention where any
visa application is finalized and refused.86 Under s.193,87
there is no requirement for the Minister or any officer to
provide a detained person with an application form for
a visa; or to advise a person that they may apply for a
visa; or to give them any opportunity to apply for a visa;
or to allow a person access to advice (whether legal or
otherwise) in  connection  with applications for  visas,
unless the detainee should specifically request it.88
The ramifications of this “cone of silence” built
around asylum seekers in detention was almost instantly
obvious. In 1993–94, 100 per cent of unauthorized arri-
vals by boat made refugee claims. In 1994–95 only 10.4
per cent did so. In 1996–97, 80 per cent of unauthorized
boat entrants were removed without requesting legal
assistance.89 Later, as part of an even tighter restriction
on information flowing to detainees, Migration Act
s.193(3)90 was amended to exclude HREOC and the
Commonwealth Ombudsmen from initiating commu-
nication with applicants to inform them of their right to
make complaints to those offices.91
In 1998 the Department absolved itself of responsibil-
ity for the day-to-day running of the detention centres
by privatizing their management to a private company.92
The deteriorating standards alleged inside the detention
centres and the long periods during which some de-
tainees found themselves incarcerated resulted in a large
number of complaints to HREOC.93 This led to an in-
quiry into the detention centres by HREOC, the result
of which was handed down in 1999.94 This report was
highly critical of the management of the detention cen-
tres and also of the policy of mandatory detention, par-
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ticularly for the vulnerable – the aged, sick, infirmed, victims
of torture and trauma, children, etc.95 In response the govern-
ment improved the quality of the holding facilities, but acted
on none of the suggested reforms,  including a model for
release of detainees on reporting conditions pending the finali-
zation of their applications.96
Upon the arrival of a large increase in the number of boats
in the second half of 1999, the government introduced the
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No1) 1999,97 which
further reduced the  right  of refugees to  apply for judicial
review of unfavourable decisions made on their Protection
Visa claims.98 In 2000 the government restricted asylum seek-
ers in detention to applications for a Temporary Protection
Visa,99 unlike the permanent residency Protection Visas
granted to those arriving in Australia lawfully and who make
their applications while still lawful (and who are not taken into
detention).100 These Temporary Protection Visas are valid for
three years, at the expiry of which they must reapply for a
Protection Visa (and hence be reassessed against the Refugee
Convention) or face removal from Australia.101 A person
granted a Temporary Protection Visa is not permitted to
sponsor their partner, spouse, or children to Australia nor are
they entitled to any form of social welfare.102
In 2001, following the MV Tampa and Aceng incidents,103
which represented a graphic intervention to expel potential
asylum seekers without entertaining claims to protection, the
government greatly increased the powers of officials to detain
and remove asylum seekers found on board boats or planes in
Australian territory.104 These are now arrested and detained
and thence deported outside Australia to third counties under
the “Pacific Solution.”105 The government claimed these laws
were designed to discourage “illegal people smuggling” into
Australia and to assert control over entry to the migration
zone.106 People detained and removed from Australia under
these laws are prohibited from applying for a Protection
Visa.107 This was achieved by excising certain places inside
Australian territory (and properly part of the “migration
zone”) from the “migration zone” for the purposes of making
a Protection Visa application. A person who enters Australian
territory and thence enters without authority an “excised off-
shore place” becomes now an “offshore entry person.” The law
empowers the arrest and detention of an offshore entry person
(or those who would become so should they enter an excised
offshore place or would become an unlawful non-citizen if
they should enter the migration zone),108 sanctions their re-
straint and removal from Australian territory to a designated
place outside Australia, and excludes the arrest, detention, and
transportation of such a person from the meaning of “immi-
gration detention” under  the Migration Act.109 These laws
grant powers to restrain or detain asylum seekers on a ship or
aircraft in Australian territory, or forcibly remove such per-
sons from a ship or aircraft,110 as well as the power to
search people so detained without warrant.111
Furthermore, the law prohibits judicial proceedings
relating to offshore entry by an “offshore entry person,”
their status as an “offshore entry person,”112 the lawful-
ness of their detention, the lawfulness of their deporta-
tion from Australia, and the prohibition on their right
to apply for a visa. The exception relates to proceedings
brought within the original jurisdiction of the High
Court under s.75 of the Constitution, which of course
cannot be utilized once the individual concerned has
been removed from Australian territory.113
This represents a dramatic extension of the detention
regime. Currently, the law now requires the detention of
all those who manage to arrive on the mainland of
Australia as unlawful non-citizens or are refused immi-
gration clearance, restricts their rights to apply for a
Protection Visa, and inhibits their access to assistance or
information regarding their legal rights. If prospective
asylum seekers are intercepted in the territorial waters
or in an excised offshore place, the law sanctions their
arrest and expulsion to a third country where they are
detained, prohibited from applying for refugee status
under Australian law, and denied access to repre-
sentation and advice. Those who arrive in the migration
zone with valid visas are permitted to enter and are not
detained so long as they apply for Protection Visa while
their visas remain valid. If their visa should expire or be
cancelled before lodging an application for a Protection
Visa, then they too are liable to be detained as unlawful
non-citizens. This entire system is now almost entirely
outside of the supervision of the courts.114
Implementation of Detention Policy
According to the government’s information115 between
1989 and November 2001, 13,489 people arrived unlaw-
fully by boatwhile109childrenwereborntothesedetainees.
All were/are kept in detention until their visa applications
or requests for protection are finalized and they were/are
either released or removed from Australia.116
In 2000–2001, 4,141 people arrived without authority
on fifty-four boats, compared with 4,175 on seventy-
four boats in 1999–2000. Of these, the majority came
from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, and over 90 per cent
were granted Protection Visas on review to the Refugee
Review Tribunal. This compares with 1989–90 when
there were 920 arrivals on forty-two boats.117
In  2000–2001, 1,508 people were refused  entry at
airports, compared with 1,695 in 1999–2000. In
1998–99, there were 3,032 unauthorized airport arrivals
compared with 610 in 1991–92.118 In recent years those
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refused clearance at airports have arrived predominantly from
Malaysia, South Korea, New Zealand, Thailand, Indonesia, the
U.K., P.R.C, the United States, India, and Japan, while 628
came from other various countries.119
In 2000–2001, forty-two people arrived as “stowaways.”
These are not normally permitted to disembark and are de-
tained on board until the ship departs. If they apply for a
Protection Visa they are removed from the ship and taken to
detention.120
The majority of boats carrying asylum seekers entered Aus-
tralian territory via Ashmore Reef, Christmas Island, and Co-
cos and Keeling Islands; i.e., they were intercepted there by the
Royal Australian Navy.121
During 2000-2001, there were 7,993 unlawful non-citizens
admitted to Australia’s immigration detention facilities.122
This is slightly fewer than the 8,205 admitted in 1999–2000 but
more than double the numbers of 3,574 in 1998–99 and 2,716
in 1997–98. DIMIA claims that this was due to the increase in
numbers of unauthorized boats arriving in Australian terri-
tory at the time.123 As at 1 November 2001, there were 2,736
people in IDCs on mainland Australia, the top five nationali-
ties being Afghani, 27.3 per cent; Iraqi, 13.2 per cent; Iranian,
7.0 per cent; Chinese, 5.2 per cent; and Indonesian, 4.5 per
cent.124 As at 1 February 2002, there were 637 women and
children detained in mainland IDCs; of these, 259 were adult
women; 224, male children; and 141, female children. There
were also thirteen unaccompanied minors in detention,125
nine other children in detention but under the care of the
South Australian Department of Human Services, and one
child in foster care after having been granted a bridging visa.126
The numbers detained in offshore detention centres, such as
Christmas Island, Manus Island, and Nauru are difficult to
ascertain, but they would number at least several hundred.127
The length of time of detention varies greatly, from several
days to some reported cases of four or five years. The govern-
ment claims that with improved processing systems, the length
of time of detention is greatly decreased. Some 80 per cent of
asylum seekers receive a primary decision on their asylum
application within eighteen weeks and 10 per cent of cases are
processed within seven weeks.128 The average time spent by a
person arriving unlawfully by boat until the time of their
release or removal was 155 days.129 If an asylum seeker
“chooses” to pursue appeals for judicial review, or “obstructs
or hinders” the processing of their claims, then the period of
time passed in detention can be greatly prolonged.130 In the year
from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001, a total of 3,465
temporary Protection Visas were granted to detainees; 1,490
cases were refused at primary level and 1,381 persons applied for
review of the refusals to the Refugee Review Tribunal. Of those
cases that had been finalized, 495 were found by the Refugee
Review Tribunal to engage Australia’s protection obliga-
tions.131
DIMIA claims that its processes for assessing refugee
claims are flexible and constantly reviewed for effective-
ness. Detainees undergo health screening within twenty-
four hours of their arrival at detention centres. If the
detainee claims to be a refugee, they are interviewed to
ascertain if, prima facie, they engage Australia’s protec-
tion obligations. The report of the interview is consid-
ered by a senior DIMIA staff member as to whether the
applicant prima facie engages Australia’s protection ob-
ligations; whether the applicant may have effective pro-
tection in another country (i.e., is engaged in “forum
shopping”); and whether they may meet “public interest
criteria” (i.e., health and character checks). This stage
may take several weeks. If the applicant satisfies all fac-
tors, they may then be granted a Temporary Protection
Visa (TPV).132 Those who are refused may apply for
review of the decision to the RRT. Any unauthorized
arrival who does not engage Australia’s protection obli-
gations and/or does not apply for a visa is subject to
removal from Australia under the provisions of the Mi-
gration Act as soon as practicable.133
According to the Department, “emphasis is placed on
the sensitive treatment of the detention population
which may include torture and trauma sufferers, family
groups, children, the elderly, people with a fear of author-
ity, and those who are seeking to engage Australia’s pro-
tection obligations under the Refugee Convention.”134
The Detention Centres
There are three Immigration Detention Centres (IDCs)
and three Immigration Reception and Processing Centres
(IRPCs) maintained by DIMIA.135 The IDCs are located
in Melbourne (established in 1966), Sydney (established
in 1976), and Perth (established in 1981), and are used to
accommodate mainly “non-boat people.”136 The IRPCs
are located at Port Hedland (established in 1991) and
Curtin (established September 1999) in Western Austra-
lia, and at Woomera in South Australia (established No-
vember 1999), and are used to detain mainly boat
people.137 There are also detention centres on Christmas
Island, Manus Island, and Nauru.
The government has also established three centres as
contingency holding centres. These are located at HMAS
Coonawarra in Darwin, NT; the Australian Army facility
in Singleton, NSW; and El Alamein in Port Augusta, SA.
The government has announced plans for a new deten-
tion centre to be established in Brisbane, but has not
formally announced a site for it.138
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The detention centres are not run directly by the govern-
ment. In 1999 these were tendered to the Australasian Correc-
tional Services Pty Ltd (hereinafter ACS), which now manages
the detention facilities on behalf of the DIMIA. DIMIA claims
it maintains an official presence at each immigration detention
facility, continually monitoring ACS’s performance against
Immigration Detention Standards (hereinafter IDS), which
were developed by DIMIA in consultation with the Common-
wealth Ombudsman’s office.
The IDS specify the standard of facilities, services, and
programs  expected  in detention  centres, including  the  re-
quirement to provide safe and secure detention. The IDS
outline the quality of life expected in the centres and take into
consideration “individual needs such as the gender, culture
and age of the detainees.”139 The government claims a full
range of services is provided at each detention facility, includ-
ing medical and dental services; education programs for chil-
dren and adults, including English-language instruction;
cultural activities; sporting activities; and religious services.140
Detainees are also assisted to prepare and lodge Protection
Visa applications  (if they request to make an application)
through the Immigration Advice and Application Assistance
Scheme (IAAAS) if they specifically request such assistance.141
The government claims that detention services “are subject
to both administrative and judicial review, and are subject to
full parliamentary scrutiny and accountability.”142 While the
government is at pains to point out that the HREOC and the
Commonwealth Ombudsman regularly visit detention cen-
tres to investigate complaints and conduct their own enquir-
ies, this ignores the fact that both these offices have been
critical of the detention centres and the detention policy in
general, and they are precluded by legislation from making
initial contact with detainees.143
In February 2001, the Minister established the Immigration
Detention Advisory Group (IDAG), which was designed to
provide advice on the adequacy of services, accommodation,
and facilities at the centres.144 Members of the IDAG have also
been critical of the standard of the detention centres and of the
detention policy following repeated riots and disturbances that
occurred towards the end of 2001 and the first few months of 2002.
The cost of the mainland detention centres for 2000–2001
was around of $104 million, a large proportion of which was
paid under the contract for managing the detention centres.
However, this figure does not include “departmental corpo-
rate costs, capital costs for the provision of detention facilities
or costs for detainees located in State correctional facilities.”
The average daily cost of maintaining the mainland detention
facilities is $120 per day per detainee.145 The cost of the “Pacific
Solution” is not included in this figure, but it is believed to be
in the vicinity of several hundred million Australian dollars.146
The Effects of Detention
Space does not permit a full canvassing of this complex
issue, and the writer is not expert in mental or general
health issues; however, the effects of Australia’s detention
policy on the asylum seekers themselves are slowly mak-
ing their way into the public’s attention.147 Among the
claimed effects of detention are the dehumanization and
objectivization of asylum seekers.148The process of deten-
tion deprives people of their identities, not only within
the detention centres themselves but also in the minds
of the general public. The plethora of terms used to
denote asylum seekers, including “detainee,” “unlaw-
ful non-citizen,” “illegal immigrant,” “boat person,”
etc., removes those individuals from being seen or
heard as people legitimately seeking Australia’s protec-
tion.149 This is caused, and in turn enables, politicians and
others to characterize the asylum seekers as criminals –
people who wilfully breach Australia’s immigration
laws, enter the borders illegally, steal jobs, and drain
resources, as well as present a threat to the national
security and public health. These characterizations
feed the perception that asylum seekers are undeserv-
ing of compassion.
Heightening the isolation of asylum seekers is the
denial of access to the detention centres by members of
the press and the general public,150 but also the interdic-
tion on providing information and advice as to their
legal rights, access to the courts, and denial of basic
fairness in the processes used to assess their claims to
protection. Likewise, the fact that a detention centre is,
for all intents and purposes, a prison, combined with the
length of time that a person can be detained, compounds
the detrimental impact, both psychological and physical,
on the detainees.151
The impact on the health of an individual detained in
remote places for lengthy periods of time is manifestly
obvious. This is aggravated by the rhetoric of politicians
particularly who enforce negative stereotyping in the
public mind. Detention disrupts family relationships,
creates stress and tension between individuals, and can
lead to destructive impulses which the detainees inflict
on themselves.152
HREOC, despite saying it is pleased with the govern-
ment’s recent improvements to the physical conditions
in which detainees are kept, has been severely critical of
the policy of detention itself. In its opinion the situation
is particularly acute for the infirm, infants, the elderly,
pregnant women, etc., there is overcrowding reported in
some centres, lack of recreational facilities, and inade-
quate sanitary conditions.153
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Justifications for Detention
The Australian government claims there are compelling rea-
sons for the mandatory detention of people who arrive in
Australia without authorization. These include:154
• conduct of essential identity and health checks;
• assessment of  character  and  security issues, ensuring that
people do not enter the community until their claims to do so
have been properly assessed by internationally agreed stand-
ards;
• providing asylum seekers access to appropriate services for the
processing of refugee applications, and helping them through
the culture shock of coming to a new country;
• ensuring their availability for removal from Australia and
maintaining the  integrity of the migration program  when
claims to remain are unsuccessful.
Superficially, these sound reasonable, since they mix legiti-
mate elements of public policy (such as the need to protect
the national interest) with the obligation to protect people
in need (the asylum seekers themselves). But uglier motiva-
tions belie the policy than these offered by DIMIA (and the
Minister).
Australia Does Not Detain Asylum Seekers
Australia claims that it does not detain asylum seekers, based
on the semantic argument that, until a person is granted refugee
status under the Refugees Convention, they are not a refugee
and therefore do not come under its provisions. If no claim is
made for refugee status, then Australia’s protection obligations
are not invoked. Given the restrictions on information pro-
vided to “unlawful arrivals,” the fact that a large proportion do
not make claims, or fail to make adequate claims, should not
be surprising. This in turn permits the government to claim
that detainees are not “asylum seekers” but “unlawful arrivals”
or “illegal immigrants”:
Australia does not have a policy of detaining asylum seekers, but
does  detain unauthorised  arrivals.  Some  of these  people sub-
sequently apply for asylum. It is worth noting that the majority of
asylum seekers have entered Australia with a valid visa and are free
in the community while they pursue their claims. Those who are
found to be refugees are released from detention immediately,
subject to health and character requirements.155
Further, the government alleges that : “mandatory detention is
the result of unlawful entry, not the seeking of asylum. People
being held in immigration detention have broken Australian law,
either by seeking to enter Australia without authority, or having
entered legally, failing to comply with their visa conditions.”156
This rhetoric shifts the onus (or blame) for detention onto
the asylum seekers themselves. Because they are characterized
as lawbreakers, public compassion for their  plight is
undermined.
Australia Is Not a Country of First Asylum
Due to Australia’s geographical position and its relative
“isolation,” the government claims Australia is far from
most refugee-producing countries, and therefore should
not be a country of first asylum.157 Resettlement in a third,
more distant, and different country to which the asylum
seeker has fled after leaving their home country is re-
garded as a last resort:158 “As Australia has not been and
clearly is not, in the majority of circumstances, a country
of first flight/asylum, it has consistently over time sought
to contribute to international responsibility sharing
through its generous resettlement program.”159
Australia subtracts the number of refugee visas
granted onshore  from the number it takes under its
offshore humanitarian program. The argument runs
that by accepting large numbers of unauthorized arri-
vals, Australia is compromised in its capacity to resettle
refugees who may be forced to remain in refugee camps
in third countries.160 The number of unlawful asylum
seekers requires countries to implement asylum process-
ing schemes which are costly and time consuming. The
government claims the system is complicated by “judi-
cial interference” in administrative decision making re-
garding protection claims, which in turn adds to the
costs, makes it more time consuming, and reduces the
tolerance of receiving nations:
[J]ust to find the relatively few refugees among those who seek
asylum, western countries are spending over ten times
UNHCR’s budget. When are we going to address an overly
legalistic system that uses up our capacity to help preventrefugee
situations at source? Are we going to wait until the already too
few resettlement countries no longer have any capacity or will-
ingness to resettle the most vulnerable refugees?161
Public Interest/National Security
Considerations based on the “national interest” involve
several discrete issues.
Domestic political interests. The public perception
(created and fed by the government) is that by detaining
asylum seekers, the government is seen to be tough in
protecting Australia’s territorial integrity and in punish-
ing those who would wilfully enter the country unlaw-
fully162 “…asylum systems are beset with identity,
nationality and claims fraud of such dimensions that the
community’s willingness to support refugees is being
eroded. That community support is essential if states are
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to be able to continue humanitarian action and resettle-
ment.”163
By statements such as these, the government has done much
through distorting the facts regarding asylum seekers to make
the issue a political one.164 This was evident before the federal
general election held in November 2001, when asylum seeker
policy, including mandatory detention, became the cental
policy debate between the various political parties.
Public interest. Detention is necessary to prevent the entry
of people who may be unidentified and who may pose health
or security risks to the Australian community.
All applicants for Temporary Protection Visas must also meet
health requirements. This is important to ensure that communica-
ble diseases are not left undetected. …While many people who
apply for asylum in Australia will meet the character requirements
for Temporary Protection Visas, there are also in immigration
detention former terrorists, former senior officers and military
personnel of despotic regimes, people who are suspected of crimes
against humanity and organisers of people smuggling rackets.165
The government states that many asylum seekers  upon
arrival have no forms of identification, having disposed of all
their personal papers en route, and that “it is not uncommon
for them to ‘change identity’ either during the journey or
processing, in the hope that it may be easier to stay if they claim
a different nationality.”166 The government requires some asy-
lum seekers to obtain formal police clearances from countries
of first asylum in which they have resided for at least twelve
months, to confirm they are of good character. This may take
several months and so lengthens the period in detention.
National security and border control. In order to protect
Australia’s borders and to maintain control of the entry of
persons into the country, detention is seen as a necessary tool
for ensuring these objectives.167 In relation to this the govern-
ment claims that detention: “…reflects Australia’s sovereign
right under international law to determine which non-citizens
are admitted or permitted to remain and the conditions under
which they may be removed.”168
And again: “This practice is consistent with the fundamen-
tal legal principle, accepted in Australian and international
law, that as a matter of national sovereignty, the State deter-
mines which non-citizens are either admitted or permitted to
remain and the conditions under which they may be re-
moved.”169
Deterrence
In the government’s view the need for deterrence covers several
aspects.
Deters queue jumpers and forum shoppers. Mandatory deten-
tion is claimed to deter those who may wish to enter Australia
illegally (“queue jump,” “forum shop,” etc.) and seeks
to punish those who have already done so.170
Deters people smuggling in circumvention of Australia’s
migration laws. The government, concerned about the
rise in illegal schemes involving people smugglers who
circumvent national borders and entry requirements,
has increased the penalties on those involved in people
smuggling/trafficking,171 but maintains mandatory de-
tention for those who wish to use people smugglers. The
government is using detention as a tool to deter and
punish people smugglers as well as asylum seekers who
should resort to them:  “The Australian  Government
believes it is important to send a clear message that it will
not tolerate the activities of people smugglers or the
illegal entry of people in Australia.”172
And again: “In recent times, people smugglers have
attempted to control who enters Australia. These
changes [to the law in November 2001] mean that Aus-
tralia is once again able to control who enters our bor-
ders and who is allowed to stay here.”173
The government’s rhetoric in this regard also shifts
the onus for people smuggling onto the asylum seekers
themselves, often without cognizance of the issues that
may drive or impel people to seek out people smugglers
in order to enter the country unlawfully: “…people are
forsaking opportunities for protection in neighbouring
countries and are using people smugglers and the asylum
system to seek access to western countries – and some
are tragically dying in the attempt.”174
In furthering its policy of deterrence, Australia’s mi-
gration law now prevents those who arrive unlawfully in
certain areas from being able to remain in Australia or
apply for refugee status: “In the past people smugglers
have sent boats to Ashmore, Cartier, Christmas, and
Cocos Islands and the people have been brought to the
mainland  by the Australian  government  at  great  ex-
pense. The new laws mean that people who travel ille-
gally to excised offshore places can no longer apply for
any visa to Australia.”175
Deters people from attempting to extend their time in
Australia. Asylum seekers are exploiting appeals to the
courts for administrative review of decisions refusing
Protection Visas (“delaying tactics”) to avoid removal
from the country. This has been encouraged by “activist
judges” who extend the scope of the Refugees Conven-
tion from that originally intended.176 By insisting asylum
seekers remain in detention, the government is “deter-
ring” abuse of the system and encouraging them to
accept repatriation. The government claims that, instead
of accepting the “decision of the umpire,”177 asylum
seekers choose to exploit the legal system at great cost to
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the Australian community and thus lengthen the period they
will spend in detention. To further deter legal appeals, the
government  has  introduced a “privative clause” which at-
tempts to remove from judicial review all decisions refusing
Protection Visas except on the basis of jurisdictional error.178
Since it is the judiciary’s role to ensure the legality of admin-
istrative decision making according to proper principles of
law,179 the policy of removing judicial supervision of adminis-
trative decisions regarding refugees, combined with the gov-
ernment’s rhetoric in this regard, represents an attack on the
independence of the judiciary itself and severely undermines
the rule of law.
Asylum Seekers Are Responsible for Their Detention
A common theme of government rhetoric justifying the deten-
tion regime is to shift the blame for detention onto the asylum
seekers themselves. Asylum seekers are portrayed as: “choos-
ing” to come to Australia illegally, rather than patiently and
properly applying for visas to come to Australia lawfully;
choosing to use illegal means, such as people smugglers, to
achieve this end; choosing to pay large sums of money in
order to gain illegal entry to the country; choosing to destroy
documentation such as passports, etc., in order to commit a
fraud against the authorities by bolstering their claims to refu-
gee status;180 and, once in Australia, by choosing to use every
available means to prevent their removal from Australia by
electing to commence lengthy and costly legal proceedings in
the Federal Court.181
People who enter Australia illegally have chosen not to apply for a
visa. There are Australian overseas missions in the countries
through which unauthorised arrivals have travelled to reach Aus-
tralia illegally and at which they could have lodged applications for
consideration under Australia’s humanitarian programs. Instead,
they have contacted international criminal organisations involved in
people smuggling. They have the resources to pay for their passage and
should not be confused with popular images of refugees who flee civil
disruption or war, on foot and with few belongings.182
And again:
Not all who arrive in Australia as unauthorised arrivals seeking
protection have genuine protection claims. Nor have they come to
Australia illegally because they could not join a “queue”. Some
persons have left protection already available to them in a safe third
country and are effectively seeking a migration outcome. Some
have been rejected under the Humanitarian Program and have
been led to believe that if they come to Australia illegally they may
achieve a more favourable outcome. Others simply do not want to
wait while their applications overseas are assessed.183
Such statements are clearly designed to undermine
support for asylum seekers within the wider Australian
community and to bolster support for the mandatory
detention policy.
Detention Is Not Prolonged or Longer Than
Necessary
The government claims that, since mandatory detention
is implemented for reasons of national security, border
control, and public interest and to uphold the integrity of
the migration system (even facilitating applications for
Protection Visas through maintaining order in the sys-
tem), the policy is not in conflict with any of Australia’s
international obligations. Indeed, the government claims
that applicants are not detained any longer than neces-
sary.184 Those that are found to be refugees are granted
visas and released immediately, while those that are re-
fused are removed from the country.185 Where a pro-
longed stay in detention occurs, this is usually the fault of
the asylum seeker themselves: “Once detained, the period
of time it takes for applications to progress through the
refugee determination process and, hence, the period of
detention is minimised.”186
The Legality of Detention
The legality of the detention of asylum seekers is highly
contentious. However, there are several instruments,
agreements, decisions, and recommendations made un-
der international law which suggest that Australia’s man-
datory detention of asylum seekers breaches
international law standards.187
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
(hereinafter UDHR)188 at Article 9 states that “[n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”
Article 10 states, “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality
to a  fair and  public  hearing by  an  independent  and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”
Article 14(1) states that “[e]veryone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion.” While these may not give rise to enforceable
rights,189 other conventions which reflect these stand-
ards, and to which Australia is a party, are pertinent
particularly the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR),190 the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CROC),191 and
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinaf-
ter CAT).192
Article 31 of the Refugees Convention states that refu-
gees should not be punished for entering the territory of
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a signatory state unlawfully, where they come directly from a
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of Article 1, provided they present themselves without
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal
entry.193 Australia argues that until it exercises its prerogative
right to grant an asylum seeker the status of a refugee under
the Refugees Convention, it is not in breach; detention is only
necessary for the regularization of the status of the individual
concerned, thus complying with Article 31(2). Once recog-
nized as a refugee, a person is immediately released from
detention.194 Therefore, refugees are not detained or penalised
per se.195 Despite this Orwellian logic, Australia’s mandatory
detention of asylum seekers has been the subject of critical
comment nationally and internationally.196
The Executive Commission of the UNHCR (ExComm) has
examined the issue of detention of asylum seekers. In Conclusion
No. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986: Detention of Refugees and Asylum
Seekers, the ExComm expressed the opinion that “in view of
the hardship which it involves, detention should normally be
avoided.”197 It stated that detention may be resorted to:
…only on grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to deter-
mine the elements on which the claim to refugee status or asylum
is based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum seekers have
destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or have used
fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the
State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to protect national
security or public order.198
ExComm is thus clear that asylum seekers should be detained
only as a last resort and only for exceptional reasons. If deten-
tion must be imposed, then it must be according to law and
according to accepted standards of human rights law; and this
includes access to representatives of the UNHCR.199 In this
respect, ExComm stresses that national legislation and/or ad-
ministrative practice should make “the necessary distinction
between the situation of refugees and asylum seekers, and that
of other aliens.”200
The UNHCR in its Revised Guidelines on Applicable Cri-
teria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seek-
ers (February 1999)201 expanded upon what ExComm had
stated. There, the UNHCR stated:202 “The detention of asy-
lum-seekers is, in the view of UNHCR inherently undesirable.
This is even more so in the case of vulnerable groups such as
single women, children, unaccompanied minors and those
with special medical or psychological needs.”
The UNHCR was of the view that this injunction against
detaining asylum seekers is in conformity with Article 14 of
the UDHR since the “right to seek asylum” expressed therein
is considered a basic human right.
The UNHCR confirmed that “detention should only
be resorted to in cases of necessity” and is only permis-
sible for set exceptions.203 However, even where an asy-
lum seeker has used fraudulent documents or travelled
with no documents at all, detention is only permissible
when there is evident a manifest intention to mislead, or
a refusal to co-operate with the authorities.204 Asylum
seekers who arrive without documentation because they
are unable to obtain any in their country of origin should
not be detained solely for that reason.205 In such cases,
detention should not be “automatic, or unduly pro-
longed.” These principles should be applied not only to
those declared to be refugees, but also to “asylum-seek-
ers pending determination of their status.” Given the
nature of the circumstances surrounding asylum seek-
ers, it is only to be expected that in attempting to exercise
this right “asylum-seekers are often forced to arrive at,
or enter, a territory illegally.”206
Indeed, the UNHCR interprets the requirements of
Article 31(1) as covering situations where an asylum
seeker has not come “directly” from their country, but
has come from another country where “protection,
safety and security could not be assured.” This implies
that even where an asylum seeker has transited through
a third country “for a short period of time  without
having applied for, or received, asylum there” they
should not be penalized for having done so.207 Each case
must be judged on its merits.208 Categorically the
UNHCR holds the view that detention must not be used
as a punitive or disciplinary measure for illegal entry or
presence in the country.209
In a similar vein are the Principles enunciated by the
UN Commission on Human Rights’ Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention (hereinafter “the Working
Group”),210 which was directed to examine the situation
of immigrants and asylum seekers, “who are allegedly
being held in prolonged administrative custody without
the possibility of administrative or judicial remedy.”211
In December 1998 the Working Group set out criteria
for determining whether or not custody is “arbitrary”212
and  shortly thereafter adopted Deliberation No. 5.213
This advises, inter alia, that: asylum seekers in detention
must have the possibility of contact with lawyers and
access to phones, faxes, and electronic mail (Principle 2);
they must be brought promptly before a judicial or other
authority (Principle 3); the decision to detain an asylum
seeker must be made by a duly empowered authority and
must be made according to law (Principle 6); a maxi-
mum length of custody should be set by law and in no
case must it be of unlimited length or excessive (Princi-
ple 7); and the UNHCR, the International Committee of
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the Red Cross (ICRC) and, where appropriate, duly author-
ized non-governmental organizations must be allowed access
to the places of custody (Principle 10).
In relation to Australia’s mandatory detention policy,
HREOC advised the Parliament in November 1997, in May
1998, and again in November 1999214 that the law requiring
detention of almost all unauthorized arrivals215 contravenes
international law. Specifically, HREOC stated:
Australia’s policy of detention of asylum seekers is automatic and
mandatory and applies to almost all unauthorised arrivals until
their claim for protection is determined finally. It goes well beyond
what ExComm Conclusion 44 deems ‘necessary’ for the purposes
of compliance with the Refugee Convention, CROC and the
ICCPR.216
Infringes Right against Arbitrary Detention
Perhaps the severest criticism of the legality of Australia’s man-
datory detention policy came from the UN Human Rights
Committee in its decision in A v. Australia in 1997, when it was
called upon to consider whether the policy infringed certain
articles contained in the ICCPR which guarantee against arbi-
trary detention.217 Article 9 of the ICCPR states, inter alia:
1.Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law….
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention
and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
Furthermore, Article 10 of the ICCPR states “Everyone is enti-
tled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”
The complaint concerned a Cambodian refugee who ar-
rived in Australia on 13 December 1989, made a claim to
refugee status, and was taken into detention on 21 December
1989. He remained there until his release in January 1994
when he was granted refugee status. The UN Human Rights
Committee found that Australia was in breach of certain of its
obligations under the ICCPR. In relation to this the UN Com-
mittee stated: “Freedom from arbitrary detention is a funda-
mental human right, and the use of detention is, in many
instances, contrary to the norms and principles of interna-
tional law.”218 More specifically, the Committee held:
... detention should not continue beyond the period for
which the  State can  provide  appropriate  justification.…
Without such factors detention may be considered arbitrary,
even if entry was illegal. In the instant case, the State Party has
not advanced any grounds particular to the author’s case,
which would justify his continued detention .... The Com-
mittee therefore concludes that the author’s detention ... was
arbitrary within the meaning of Article 9, paragraph 1.”
The Committee then advised that: “to avoid the taint
of arbitrariness, detention must be a proportionate
means to achieve a legitimate  aim, having regard to
whether there are alternative means available which are
less restrictive of rights.”219
As the UNHCR observed:220
[f]or detention of asylum-seekers to be lawful and not arbi-
trary, it must comply not only with the applicable national
law, but with Article 31 of the Convention and international
law. It must be exercised in a non-discriminatory manner
and must be subject to judicial or administrative review to
ensure that it continues to be necessary in the circumstances,
with the possibility of release  where no grounds for its
continuation exist.
HREOC similarly noted, “[m]andatory minimum
terms of imprisonment do not allow the judiciary to
apply proper sentencing principles.”221
Detainees should thus have the right to appear before
properly constituted courts to ensure that their deten-
tion is according to law and either to determine the
period of detention or to order their release. The fact that
Australia’s detention policy is mandatory with no discre-
tion not to apply it to an individual, irrespective of the
circumstances, and given there is no recourse by a de-
tained individual to judicial review of that detention,
means ipso facto that it results in arbitrary detention.222
This is the more so since no appropriate justification for
applying the policy has been properly advanced by Aus-
tralia.
The indeterminate length of the detention which an
asylum seeker faces under Australia’s policy (in that, in
order to substantiate their claim to protection, it may
take months or even years to be processed through the
system) means that there is a lack of proportionality
between the act that leads to detention and the detention
itself.223 This is also contrary to the UNHCR Guidelines,
which state that detention must be “reasonable” and
“proportionate to meet the standard set out by ICCPR
article 9.1.”
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Indeed, detention for any purpose outside those stated in
ExComm Conclusions, the UNHCR Guidelines, and the deci-
sion of the UN Human Rights Committee, and contrary to
international human rights norms, is in breach of interna-
tional law.224 Asylum seekers should have access to procedures
for determining refugee status or granting asylum that are
quick and fair, and they should not be detained through
application of a mandatory policy. The distinction should
always be drawn between the position of refugees and asylum
seekers, and that of other aliens.225 In this regard, UNHCR
guidelines state that the detention of asylum seekers for any
other purpose, “for example, as part of a policy to deter future
asylum seekers, or to dissuade those who have commenced
their claims from pursuing them, is contrary to the norms of
refugee law.”226
Australia’s policy does not make such distinctions, but
rather selects all unlawful non-citizens who arrive in Australia
unlawfully, including prospective asylum seekers, for punish-
ment for the expressed purpose of deterrence. The same con-
clusions can be made regarding the detention of asylum
seekers on boats within territorial waters pursuant to s245F(9)
of the Migration Act, their expulsion from Australia to third
countries, and their detention there in centres run by the
Australian authorities.227
Infringes Obligations Not to Discriminate
Article 7 of the UDHR states, “All are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of
the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimi-
nation in violation of this Declaration and against any incite-
ment to such discrimination.” This is reflected in the ICCPR,
Article 26, which states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status”[emphasis added].
Article 2 of the CROC makes similar guarantees in relation to
children.
Australian policy clearly discriminates between those who
claim asylum after arriving on valid visas and thence are
immigration cleared, those who arrive in the migration zone
without visas who are detained, and those who arrive in an
“excised offshore place” and who are detained and expelled to
third countries. This creates three classes of asylum seekers
who are not treated equally by law or policy.228 This includes
the fact that asylum seekers who arrive in the migration zone
unlawfully are restricted to Temporary Protection Visas,
are not granted travel permits, and are prohibited from
sponsoring members of their immediate families,229
while those removed from Australia under the “Pacific
Solution” are prohibited from applying for refugee
status under Australian law. HREOC is of the view that
this differentiation in policy application is discrimina-
tory on the basis of the status of the asylum seekers and
therefore infringes the above mentioned human rights
instruments.230
Infringes Non-Refoulement Obligations
The expulsion and detention of asylum seekers under the
“Pacific Solution” puts Australia at risk of violating its
duties not to expel or refouler refugees under Articles 32
and 33 of the Refugees Convention231and the non-refoule-
ment provisions of the CAT Article 3,232the ICCPR Article
7, and the CROC Articles 3, 20, 22, 39, and 37. This is
because there are no guarantees that detainees will have
information concerning their right to claim protection,
there is no guarantee that their claims will be properly
assessed, and there is no appeal right against adverse
decisions made on their status in these circumstances.233
There is also no right for these individuals to apply for
refugee status under Australian law, as this can only be
applied for in the Australian migration zone. This means
individuals detained in third countries under the “Pacific
Solution” are at risk of being refouled to their countries
in contravention of the above-mentioned conventions.
For those detained in mainland IDCs, the fact that
there is no onus to provide information to detainees on
their legal rights unless the detainee should specifically
request it, may well lead to the refoulement of an individ-
ual who may not have been aware that they had the right
in Australian law to claim protection under the Refugees
Convention, again contrary to the above mentioned con-
ventions.
Denies Right of Asylum Seekers to Apply for
Refugee Status
Closely linked with the above, the restrictions on provid-
ing information to prospective asylum seekers in main-
land IDCs as to their rights to claim asylum effectively
inhibit the individual’s right to claim asylum and to have
their cases assessed against international standards.234
Worse, the fact that an individual can only claim refugee
status within the Australian migration zone means that
removal of asylum seekers pursuant to the “Pacific Solu-
tion” prevents them from seeking to apply for refugee
status or from having Australia’s protection obligations
to them under the Refugees Convention invoked. This
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infringes Article 14 of the UDHR; Article 31 of the Refugees
Convention; provisions of the CROC; and the ICCPR.235
Rights of the Child
There are various articles contained in the CROC which guar-
antee that a child will not suffer discrimination, will be treated
equally before the law, will not be detained arbitrarily, and will
not be subject to torture or trauma, etc.236 According to the
UNHCR Guidelines,237 Australia is obliged to ensure an appro-
priate environment for children who are detained. If children
who are asylum seekers are detained they must not be held
under “prison-like” conditions. All efforts must be made to
have them released from detention and placed in other accom-
modation.238 Australia fails this, especially considering there are
some 365 children in mainland IDCs as well as some fifteen
children who are unaccompanied minors – even more so given
that under the Migration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946
(Cth) the Minister is the Guardian charged with their welfare.239
The government has rejected criticism of its policy of de-
taining children. The Department stated: “The Australian
Government is aware of its responsibilities under the UN-
CROC and does its utmost to ensure that children are treated
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.”240 Re-
cently the government has commenced trial of a scheme under
a Memorandum of Understanding with the South Australian
Department of Human Services to provide alternative care to
certain unaccompanied minors. Currently there are nine chil-
dren placed under this alternative care mechanism.241
There have been several accusations of sexual abuse of
children in the detention centres. DIMIA claims that it re-
sponded quickly on being notified of these allegations, alerting
the police and  ensuring the children received counselling.
However, this begs the question of why children are kept in a
situation where they are at risk in the first place. Detention
centres after all are prisons, and the activities of the inmates
cannot be monitored all the time. The fact that children are
detained at all is clearly in breach of the CROC.242
Infringes Obligations Not to Inflict Torture or Cruel
or Unusual Punishment
Article 7 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment….” Article 16 of the CAT states:
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under
its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article
1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with
the consent of acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations con-
tained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution
for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Article 37 of the CROC states:
States Parties shall ensure that; (a) No child shall be sub-
jected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be im-
posed for offences committed by persons below eighteen
years of age…”
Given  the evidence that the Australian mandatory
detention policy inflicts mental and physical detriment
on asylum seekers, is of undefined duration, and is in-
flicted arbitrarily, it could be concluded that Australia is
in breach of the above conventions. It is arguable that
mandatory detention results in the infliction of (at the
very least) cruel and unusual punishment, if not, in some
circumstances, torture.
Alternatives to Detention
The scope of alternative schemes to the mandatory de-
tention policy is too complex for canvassing in this paper;
suffice to note that several alternatives to detention have
been proposed.243 HREOC  in the “Submission to the
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee
inquiry into Australia’s refugee and humanitarian pro-
gram” recommended, inter alia:244
1. Australia should replace the current system of
mandatory universal detention of unauthorized
arrivals with the alternative set of community
release based on reporting conditions.
2. All immigration detainees should be permitted to
apply for release on the ground that their deten-
tion is unnecessary and/or disproportionate and
should provide for judicial review of all unsuc-
cessful applications.
3. Australia’s commitments under international
law require the retention of the right of appeal
and judicial review for protection visa applicants.
4. Australia must present the opportunity to all asy-
lum seekers to receive protection where their
claims fall within other international conven-
tions such as the ICCPR, CAT, etc.
The government has not acted upon these suggestions
and has even rejected the principles that HREOC formu-
lated to  govern  the current detention system. In the
government’s response to the findings on a complaint
lodged with the HREOC, the Department stated that it
rejected the Commission’s Detention Centre Guidelines
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in preference for its own principles to assess standards inside
the detention centres:
Immigration detention management and services are governed by
the Immigration Detention Standards (IDS) developed by DIMA,
in consultation with the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office.
DIMA advised the former Human Rights Commissioner, Mr Si-
doti, in November 1999 that the IDS, which form part of DIMA’s
contractual agreement with ACM, meet Australia’s international
obligations in relation to core human rights principles.245
Observations
The justification employed by the Australian government for
detaining asylum seekers  focuses  on the need for national
security and public health, and on the deterrent effect that it is
supposed to have in protecting the borders.246 This strategy
clearly singles out unlawful asylum seekers for treatment dif-
ferent from that applied to asylum seekers who arrive on valid
visas. Since the difference in treatment is detention, limited
rights, and even expulsion under its so-called “Pacific Solu-
tion,”247 it is impossible not to conclude those arriving unlaw-
fully in Australian territory are being punished for so doing.
This is a matter of concern since it breaches Australia’s
responsibilities under the ICCPR, the CROC, and the Refugees
Convention against discrimination and punishment of asylum
seekers, and infringes the rule against arbitrary detention. The
detention of children is clearly contrary to international hu-
man rights norms. The semantic argument used by Australia,
that asylum seekers are not refugees until granted that status
and hence no specific duties are owed to them, merely obfus-
cates the real issue – that is, whether Australia has a duty to
assess claims to asylum from those who arrive on its shores in
a just manner, regardless of whether their arrival was lawful;
or whether Australia can avoid its obligation to assess claims
for protection by using detention and expulsion as tools to
prevent applications for asylum being made in the first place.
Australia has consistently maintained a policy of executive
control of the country’s migration intake, preferring only
those applicants processed from other countries, and deter-
ring those who may seek asylum directly in Australia. On face
value this may seem sensible enough. But essentially it involves
a blurring of the issues of control of borders and national
security with obligations owed to asylum seekers. In the con-
test between the two competing interests, international hu-
man rights obligations have consistently played second
fiddle.248 To justify its policy, the official rhetoric over some
twenty-five years has been to dehumanize and delegitimize
asylum seekers. This undermines support in the public mind
for a humanitarian response, which in turn demands a strong
response from government to be seen to be doing something
about it, irrespective of the individual circumstances which
may have impelled the asylum seeker in the first place.
The Minister justifies the mandatory detention regime
as punishing and deterring what are referred to as
“queue  jumpers,” “forum shoppers,” and “lawbreak-
ers,”249 maintaining that Australia should not be a coun-
try of first asylum as this is “unfair” to refugees waiting
in camps.250 The emphasis on “fairness” or concern for
the refugees251 (as opposed to those arriving unlawfully
by boat) forms a large part of the official rhetoric towards
onshore asylum seekers.
What the government fails to understand is that there
is no competition or tension between the two policy
objectives. Indeed, it is possible to maintain border con-
trol and security without sacrificing the rights of human
beings in the process.252 Regardless of whether asylum
seekers are admitted and processed or not, the govern-
ment maintains effective control of the borders and
national security. No matter how an individual arrives
in Australia, the government determines whether that
person may remain in Australia and on what conditions.
Whether such people are detained is not strictly relevant.
The central issue regarding the problem of asylum seekers
is one of fairness and expeditious processing of claims –
rather than whether or not detention policy is efficacious
in maintaining border control. Clearly it is not – since
the asylum seekers keep coming and have consistently
done so for the past fourteen years.253
National security became particularly important fol-
lowing the sad events of 11 September 2001. However,
the government rhetoric in this regard was particularly
base, since it cast aspersions on all people arriving from
Middle Eastern countries and of Arab backgrounds as
posing considerable risk to the Australian community.254
Much residual sympathy for asylum seekers at this point
quickly evaporated as the detention policy and border
control became the central policy debate in the lead-up
to the federal general election in November 2001.255
Despite the government’s claims that its policy main-
tains strong borders, it is futile to hope that the borders
of any country can be made impermeable to those who
may be fleeing hardship and distress. If someone is
driven by desperation to attempt to come to Australia,
they will do so no matter how severe the detention
regime nor how tight the government attempts to make
the frontiers.
Even if detention were considered necessary for the
purposes of confirming the identity of arrivals and for
public health reasons, these issues do not justify manda-
tary detention for an extended period as the government
maintains. Most identification checks and all necessary
health checks should only require a few weeks to carry
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out, and if a proper system, say, of mandatory reporting were
instituted, there would be no necessity to keep the vast major-
ity of people currently held in IDCs. This would be at far less
social and economic cost to the Australian community than is
now the case.
Most asylum seekers pass through another country before
arriving in Australia where, it is alleged, if they were genuine
refugees, they would have sought asylum. This puts unlawful
asylum seekers in a “pincer movement”: either they remain in
third countries and await processing to come to Australia
(which, for the reasons discussed below, may never happen)
or they would accept asylum in that country to which they have
fled. In any event there would be no need for them to come to
Australia unlawfully.
This is a simplistic argument which conveniently overlooks
several important facts, not least of which is that it is only
possible to claim refugee  status  when in the  territory of a
signatory state. The government’s assertion that there is an
orderly queue for “refugee status” outside Australia is com-
plete fiction: the definition of a refugee under Article 1A(2) of
the Refugees Convention is not the criterion of any offshore
class of visa that Australia offers. Under international law,
while there may not yet exist an agreed “right to seek asylum,”
those countries which are signatory to the Refugees Conven-
tion have assumed a duty not to refoule or expel any person
who comes within the ambit of the definition of a refugee as
found in Article 1A(2). In the view of some, this is in order to
deter signatory states from adopting practices that may deter
prospective refugees from entering their territory to claim
protection.256 It would hence make a mockery of the Conven-
tion if signatory states (like Australia) were to adopt policies
which would prevent or  deter  a prospective refugee  from
entering their territory to claim their protection. If at best
Australia’s policy is not a breach of its obligations under the
Refugees Convention, it is definitely not in compliance with
its spirit.
Given Australia’s geographical location it is virtually impos-
sible to arrive directly without first passing through a third
country. Many of the countries that lie on the route to Austra-
lia (such as Indonesia and Thailand) are not signatories to the
Refugees Convention, and not all Australian embassies have
Immigration Department offices capable of processing such
claims. Indeed, many of the countries that have refugee exo-
duses or are the first port of call for asylum seekers have no
Australian representation at all.257 This necessitates that pro-
spective applicants send their applications through the post to
the Australian immigration office that has responsibility for
such applications.258 Applications must be made in English
and must have accompanying documentation, including iden-
tity documents and other forms of proof substantiating the
applicant’s claims. This poses difficulties for those people who
do not have education or status or other forms of access
to information; indeed, it becomes impossible for the
bulk of asylum seekers.
Furthermore, most applicants who are in refugee
camps are not aware they can make applications for
protection in Australia. Even if they manage to make an
application they  can wait years to be processed, and
frequently the only correspondence they may receive
from the Department will be a rejection of their claims.
There are no appeal rights from decisions to refuse a visa
applied for offshore, no right of putting a case in person,
nor any obligation on immigration officers to inform
applicants about evidential problems with their claims.
Finally, but importantly, applications received at Austra-
lian posts are not processed in a “first in, first served”
basis. Applications are processed until the officer is sat-
isfied the applicant meets the requirements for the grant
of the visa or not. Those that are approved may not be
granted a visa if the quota for the financial year has
already been reached; in this case, they could be held over
for years before final decision.
For the above reasons, the criticism and punishment
of asylum seekers for resorting to people traffickers is
easy to refute. Desperation will force people to try any
means to alleviate their condition. This makes them easy
prey to people smugglers who exploit them to the point
that their lives can be threatened. However, the Austra-
lian government prefers to punish the asylum seekers
with detention or expulsion.
The government would do better to address the issues
as to why so many people should risk their lives and
savings to attempt to come to Australia in a perilous sea
voyage; they may in fact find that all the answers would
be legitimate as to why a person should do so. Persecu-
tion (for Refugees Convention or some other reason),
repression, discrimination, and poverty are sadly too
common a state of affairs for a large proportion of the
population of this planet. The desire to find solace in
other countries (and the need to use any means at one’s
disposal to do so) means that industrialized nations will
continue to have problems with asylum seekers until
these root causes are addressed.
However, one may ask why, if the policy of detaining
refugees were so successful  in achieving its ends,  do
boatloads of asylum seekers keep arriving?259 Why do
successive Australian governments see the need to slowly
remove detention from the purview of the courts and
forbid media and other access to the detention centres?
As part of this, the government shifts the onus onto the
system’s critics to propose alternatives to the detention
regime, despite the fact that an alternative scheme has
Volume 20 Refuge Number 3

never been trialled nor publicly canvassed and that the gov-
ernment shows no inclination to do so. In truth, the number
of onshore asylum seekers arriving unlawfully every year in
Australia is relatively insignificant compared with most other
industrialized nations, yet the passion that it evokes and the
severity of the government response are wholly out of propor-
tion.260
Due to economic pressures within, and a Machiavellian
twisting of policy and public opinion, Australia has become a
place where asylum seekers are increasingly demonized and
where, far from being seen as people deserving of compassion,
they are viewed as objects deserving of punishment. It seems
that compassion comes at too high a price, but that AUD$1bil-
lion  to detain asylum seekers and to support the “Pacific
solution” is not too costly. Quick and proper processing of
refugee claims would offer those who are genuinely fleeing
persecution the chance to normalize their lives more quickly
without the infliction of further trauma which currently oc-
curs when a person may be incarcerated in a detention centre
for an indeterminate period. Other counties which receive far
larger numbers of asylum seekers than Australia manage to do
so without detention and with far less fuss. It is perhaps more
a reflection on the dark side of human nature and a level of
immaturity in the Australian political processes than a reflec-
tion  of  policy which  is proper and  truly beneficial  to the
Australian community as a whole.
There are no plans for the Australian government to ame-
liorate the system of mandatory detention, let alone to abolish
it.261 The policy still enjoys bipartisan support in Parliament,
and without a seismic ground-shift in public opinion, this is
not likely to change in the near future; although cracks in its
support are starting to appear.
Conclusion
Detention centres tend to be placed in remote parts of Austra-
lia, in fact, anywhere that is not easily accessible to the bulk of
Australian citizens, their representatives, the advocates repre-
senting the asylum seekers, and members of the press. By way
of justification, the government claims that detention is neces-
sary for security and public health risks that detainees pose to
the Australian community. Detention is a mandatory regime
under which there is no right to access legal advice, to make visa
applications, or to have information about visas (even that
asylum seekers may be eligible to apply for visas).262
The result of this policy is that the asylum seekers them-
selves remain largely faceless and voiceless – something which
obviously works to the advantage of the government, which
wishes to exploit the issue of asylum seekers for domestic
political purposes. It does not take one long to find negative
representations of asylum seekers in the mass media, usually
fed by politicians, even emanating from the Immigration
Minister or the Prime Minister’s office.263
The mandatory detention policy has taken a heavy
toll: personal (for the mental health and well-being of
asylum seekers themselves),264 social, economic, and le-
gal. It has caused severe schisms within Australian soci-
ety and made many think seriously about the state of
Australian democracy, in that the governing political
party can unscrupulously manipulate public opinion for
the sake of votes and sacrifice the basic rights of human
beings in the process. It has also brought Australia’s
international reputation into disrepute. It can only be
concluded that such a cost, compared with what the
policy of mandatory detention is supposed to achieve, is
too much.
Openness and accountability are keystones of democ-
racy – but it would seem that in Australia the govern-
ment has implemented legislation that effectively
deprives detained asylum seekers of normal democratic
safeguards.265 To make matters worse, some detainees
can find themselves detained for periods amounting to
years, which, under tyrannical regimes, would be con-
sidered at the least as “severe or unusual punishment”
and at worst as “torture” – even the more so when one
considers that under Australian law, even those accused
of the most heinous crimes still obtain the right to apply
for bail pending the outcome of a trial.266
Men, women, and children peering out through
barbed-wire fences, detained in camps in remote places,
far from the eyes of the public who know little, if any-
thing, about the issues involved, how these camps are
run, and in what standard the inmates are kept: one
might be forgiven for thinking that such an image is
drawn from camps dating to another era. This, however,
is the image of detention centres currently run by the
Australian government to house asylum seekers. This is
not an image that bodes well for a country that claims
moral leadership on global issues.
Sadly, until elected politicians cease to exploit human
rights as a tool of political expediency and there is an
informed, intelligent debate within the wider Australian
community concerning detention policy, asylum seekers
will continue to remain, literally and figuratively, “be-
tween a rock and a hard place” if they should attempt to
seek asylum on Australia’s shores.
Notes
1. Infra note 17. All Australian legislation can be obtained
online: Australasian Legal Information Institute
Homepage fs2 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/> (date accessed:
24 February 2002). The “Immigration Department” has
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undergone various name changes reflecting its role according to
evolving government policy. It has been known as “DILGEA”
(Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Af-
fairs); “DIEA” (Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs);
“DIMA” (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs)
and most recently “DIMIA” (Department of Immigration, Mul-
ticultural and Indigenous Affairs). The same applies to the title of
the  Minister  for Immigration, whose various acronyms have
included “MILGEA”, “MIEA,” and “MIMA,” and who is now
referred to by the acronym “MIMIA” (Minister for Immigration,
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs). In this paper I shall refer
to the former as “DIMIA” and the latter as the “Immigration
Minister” or the “Minister.” Since no Immigration Minister has
been female, I refer to the person holding that office with the third
person pronoun “he” and its declensions.
2. I.e., without a valid visa, and more often than not without identity
papers and passports. The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (No.62 of
1958) (hereinafter Migration Act), s.13(1) defines a “lawful non-
citizen” as “a non citizen in the migration zone who holds a visa
that is in effect”; s.14 defines “unlawful non-citizen” as a person
who is present within the “migration zone” unlawfully, i.e., with-
out a valid visa: infra note 47 and 69. See Department of Immi-
gration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Unauthorised
Arrivals and Detention – Information Paper (Canberra: DIMIA, 15
October 2001) at 3; online: DIMIA Homepage <http://www.
immi.gov.au/illegals/uad/ uad_paper.pdf>  (date accessed: 20
February 2002): “In broad terms, there are four kinds of unlawful
non-citizens: persons whose visas have expired, persons whose
visas have been cancelled, persons who have entered Australia
illegally (unauthorised arrivals) and persons whose visas have
ceased by operation of migration law.”
3. Most often “refugee status,” which is a criterion for Protection
Visas: infra note 9.
4. The mandatory detention policy covers all “unlawful non-citi-
zens” including those who have arrived unlawfully. All are com-
monly referred to as “detainees.” For the purposes of this paper
“asylum seekers” shall be used to denote more specifically those
who arrive by boat or plane without lawful permission, are denied
entry, and may or may not have actually applied for a Protection
Visa.
5. Given the length of time that some spend in detention, many of
the children can spend their early childhood or some of their
formative years in detention, although never willingly having
committed an offence against any law of the Commonwealth: M.
Einfeld, “Is There a Role for Compassion in Refugee Policy ?”
(2000) 23(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal [here-
inafter UNSW L.J] 303–14 at 308. For the numbers of women and
children in mainland detention centres, infra note 126. Under the
Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth), s. 6 the
Immigration Minister is the guardian of all non-citizen children
who do not arrive in the company of a relative over the age of
twenty-one.
6. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [hereinafter
HREOC], Those Who’ve Come across the Sea: Detention of Unau-
thorised Arrivals (Canberra: AGPS 1998) at 101: “[h]unger strikes
are not a new phenomenon among asylum seekers de-
tained in Australian immigration detention centres. They
certainly occurred in the early 1980s. In response to a
hunger strike in 1992 by three Cambodian women at Vil-
lawood, the then Minister for Immigration promulgated a
regulation allowing the Department to direct physicians to
force-feed asylum seekers whose lives are at risk because of
their refusal to eat. The provision has been amended from
its original form and is now contained in [Migration Regu-
lations 1994] regulation 5.35.” According to the press in-
formation page, Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock
MP, “Detention Update”, as at 28 January 2002 there were
287 individuals on hunger strike in mainland Australia’s
IDCs (including five minors); forty-one individuals had
“stitched” their lips together in protest, and of these nine
were also participants in the hunger strike. Online: Immi-
gration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP Homepage
<http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/detention/update.h
tm> (date accessed: 24 March 2002).
7. “Refugees Desperate” The Age (27 January 2002); “Policy
on Refugees Repugnant – We Are All Immigrants” The Age
(26 January 2002); “Never Confuse the Law with Justice”
The Sydney Morning Herald (30 January 2002); “Refugee
Hunger Protest Grows” The Sunday Age (16 January
2002).
8. In July 2000, the UN Human Rights Committee stated:
“The Committee considers that the mandatory detention
under the Migration Act of ‘unlawful non-citizens’, includ-
ing asylum seekers, raises questions of compliance with
article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which provides that
no person shall be subjected to arbitrary detention. The
Committee is concerned at the State party’s policy, in this
context of mandatory detention, of not informing the de-
tainees of their right to seek legal advice and of not allowing
access of non-governmental human rights organizations to
the detainees in order to inform them of this right.” Online:
UNHCHR Homepage <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/e1015b8a76fec400c12569490
0433654? Opendocument> (date accessed: 25 September
2001); HREOC, Preliminary Report on the Detention of Boat
People (November 1997). HREOC, supra note 6; HREOC,
Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References
Committee inquiry into Australia’s refugee and humanitar-
ian program (November 2000)(infra note 85); Human
Rights Watch, No Safe Refuge: The Impact of the September
11 Attacks on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants in the
Afghanistan Region and Worldwide, Human Rights Watch
Backgrounder (18 October  2001); U.S.  Department  of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2001:
Australia, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, 4 March 2002; online: U.S. State Depart-
ment Homepage <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001/eap/8249.htm> (date accessed: 24 March
2002).
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9. Migration Act, s.36(1) states that a criterion of a Protection Visa is
that the applicant “meets the definition of a refugee as found in
the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of
28th July 1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
31 January 1967”. See UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva: UNHCR, Janu-
ary 1992) [“UNHCR Handbook”], online: UNHCR Homepage
<http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ home?page=publ>
(date accessed: 21 February 2002). The Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, Australian
Treaty Series (A.T.S.) 1954, No. 5 (entered into force for generally
and for Australia 22 April 1954). The Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, A.T.S. 1973
No. 37 (entered into force generally 4 October 1967, entered into
force for Australia 13 December 1973). Both the Refugees Conven-
tion and the Optional Protocol are referred hereinafter as the
“Refugees Convention.” The Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
(hereinafter “1994 Regulations”) contain the other criteria for the
grant of a Protection Visa, among which is that “the Minister is
satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has
protection obligations under the Refugees Convention” [1994
Regulations, Schedule 2, Part 866, clause 866.221; and Schedule 2,
Part 785, clause 785.221].
10. The government claims that journalists and photographers from
many media organizations have participated in tours to Immigra-
tion Detention Centres (hereinafter IDCs) arranged by the De-
partment. There have been numerous tours of IDCs since 1992.
In recent years the media visited Port Hedland in June 1999 and
February 2000; Woomera in November 1999 and in January,
March, and December 2001; Maribyrnong in March 2001; and
Curtin in June 2001. Of course, these “tours” are arranged by the
Department and are highly orchestrated and controlled; the gov-
ernment claims this is for security reasons and the need to protect
the identity and privacy of asylum seekers: infra note 92. The
government further claims that visits to the centre by external
bodies average more than one a week and that this demonstrates
“that the immigration detention program is among the most
closely scrutinised of government programs.” On 26 January
2002, during riots and unrest at the Woomera Detention Centre,
the media were forcibly removed from outside the perimeter
fencing; however, the government stated that DIMIA had no
knowledge of the directive to move the media and that it was not
a DIMIA directive. This of course begs the question, if DIMIA did
not know of the directive what other events concerning the IDCs
is the government not aware of? The government claims that
IDCs are monitored or scrutinized, that they are subject to both
administrative and judicial review, and that they are subject to full
parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, even claiming that
immigration detention is among the most closely scrutinized
government programs. A number of government and non-gov-
ernment agencies make regular visits to detention facilities, such
as the HREOC, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Australian
Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee  on Migration, other
members of Parliament, and the Immigration Detention Advi-
sory Group. Press information page of the website of the Immi-
gration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, “January 2002 Re-
buttals to False Information Relating to Immigration De-
tention”; on-line: Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock
MP Homepage <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/de-
tention/update.htm> (date accessed: 24 March 2002).
11. “Boat people” is the term commonly used to denote those
arriving unlawfully by boat in Australian territory.
12. These countries usually accept this burden after being
granted millions of dollars in extra aid assistance. This
should be added to the true financial cost of the policy; see
“Costello Forced to Find $400m as Refugee Costs Spiral”
Australian Financial Review, (14 February 2002) and
“Budget Faces $1.8bn Hit from Refugees and Terror” Aus-
tralian Financial Review (30 January 2002).
13. The name the government devised for its program of expel-
ling asylum seekers.
14. Infra note 127.
15. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 63 & 64 Vic-
toria c12,  s.51(xix), (xxvii), (xxix).
16. The most notable exception being aliens classified as “hos-
tile” or as “enemy aliens” in time of war.
17. Chu Kheng Lim v. MILGEA (1992) 110 ALR 97 at 107
(hereinafter “Lim v. MILGEA (1992)”).
18. These concerns have arisen partly from historical factors
and partly from political expediency. Australia’s relative
geographic remoteness, its large size (being an island con-
tinent) and relatively small population have fostered the
belief that Australia is remote but also vulnerable. This has
led to a certain amount of underlying paranoia in the
Australian psyche (which  is  easily manipulated) about
feared invasions from the heavily populated areas of Asia
to the north and a fear of losing control of the migration
system. This fear concerning the geographic placement of
Australia was manifested in the “White Australia policy” in
force until 1973 under which only white Europeans were
permitted to migrate to the country. Arrival by boat of
(what seems to the Australian mind) large numbers of
asylum seekers from Asia tends to awaken these deeply held
fears, an irony considering that the only invasion of Australia
to have taken place in the last forty millennia was that of white
Europeans. Australia’s policy of preferring repatriation of
asylum seekers is expressed in the following article: P. Rud-
dock, “Refugee Claims and Australian Migration Law: A
Ministerial Perspective” (2000) 23(3) UNSW L.J 1–12 at 3–4.
19. This empowered the Minister to grant an applicant a visa
according to his discretion. The practice arose that his press
releases would indicate on what basis he would exercise this
discretion to do so. This system remained in place until
December 1989.
20. Between 1976 and 1978, fifty-five boats arrived in Australia
carrying 2,087 people. By 3 July 1979 Australia had ac-
cepted over  6,000 refugees  from Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam. In order to manage the crisis, Australia signed
bilateral agreements with several Southeast Asian countries
such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Indonesia in which it
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agreed to receive refugees processed in camps in those countries,
in return for which those governments would restrict the passage
of asylum seekers through their territory to Australia. See A.
Schloenhardt, “Australia and the Boat-People: 25 Years of Unau-
thorised Arrivals” (2000) 23(3) UNSW L.J. 33–55 at 34–35.
21. Between 1977 and 1989 the process of determining whether a
person had the status of a refugee was a matter which lay within
the discretion of the executive: see D. H. N. Johnson, “Refugees,
Departees, and Illegal Migrants” (1980) 9 Sydney Law Review
[hereinafter Syd. L.R] 11 at 47; I. Shearer," Extradition and Asy-
lum" in J. Ryan, ed., International Law in Australia, 2nd ed.
(Sydney: Lawbook Co., 1984) at 206. Until 1980 with the intro-
duction into the Migration Act of s.6A(1)(c) (infra, note 25), it
appears that there was no Commonwealth legislative or regula-
tory provision which referred to any mechanism for deciding
whether a person had the “status of refugee,” what obligations
were owed to a person who was determined to have such a status,
nor expressly or impliedly conferred upon any Minister or other
person the function of making a determination that a person had
that status for the purposes of Australian law. By administrative
arrangements, responsibility for refugees had been allotted to the
Immigration  Minister who  established an  interdepartmental
committee to advise him on the question whether a particular
person was a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Conven-
tion. If the recommendation was positive, the Minister would
utilize the provisions of the Migration Act under which he had
discretionary power to grant a visa. The functions of the Minister
and the interdepartmental committee in determining refugee
status had no statutory foundation but were carried on as a
prerogative of the executive until 1989.
22. Schloenhardt, supra note 20 at 35–36.
23. The Association of South East Asian Nations [hereinafter AS-
EAN] called for UN intervention. The Meeting on Refugees and
Displaced  Persons in  South East  Asia was called  by  the  UN
Secretary General and held in Geneva in July 1979.
24. UNHCR, Report UN Doc A/AC.96/751 (1990) 2. Malaysia even
turned boats out to sea: Schloenhardt, supra note 20 at 35–36.
25. Introduced into the Migration Act by the Migration Amendment
Act (No 2)(1980) (Cth) (No.175 of 1980). Following amendment,
Migration Act, s.6A(1)(c) read: “(1) an entry permit shall not be
granted to a non-citizen after his entry into Australia unless one
or more of the following conditions is fulfilled in respect of him,
that is to say – … (c) he is the holder of a temporary permit which
is in force and the Minister has determined by instrument in
writing that he has the status of a refugee within the meaning of
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at
Geneva on 28 July 1951 or of the Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees that was done at New York on 31 January 1967.” A
person who has entered Australia, but did not hold a valid entry
permit (either because it was refused on arrival, or it was cancelled
or expired subsequent to that person’s entry to Australia), was
defined by s.6 (1) of the Migration Act, as a “prohibited immigrant.”
26. No.112 of 1980.
27. IUA Act, ss.13, 17, 20, 23 and 26.
28. IUA Act, s.9(4).
29. IUA Act, s.12 (1); the “relevant passenger” was defined in
s.9.
30. IUA Act s.14 determined a prescribed authority to be a
Magistrate et al. appointed as such under the legislation of
the respective States of the Federation and pursuant to an
agreement for this purpose by the Governor General.
31. IUA Act, s.12(2).
32. IUA Act, s.12(3).
33. IUA Act, s.12(3)(a).
34. IUA Act, s.12(3)(b). The entry permit could be issued to the
person under the IUA Act, s.10(1), in which case the person
was deemed to have entered Australia on the day the entry
permit was granted.
35. IUA Act, s.12(3)(c).
36. IUA Act, s.11(1).
37. IUA Act, s.12(5).
38. No.112 of 1983.
39. Migration Act, s.15 – now substituted.
40. Some countries, such as Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei,
refused to admit the boat people: V. Muntarbhorn, The
Status of Refugees in Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
at 97, 127 & 129; A. Helton, “The Comprehensive Plan of
Action for Indo Chinese Refugees” (1990) 8 New York Law
School Journal of Human Rights 111 at 111–13.
41. Held in Geneva on 13–14 June 1989; Helton, supra note 40
at 111–13.
42. UN Doc A/44/523 (22 Sept 1989).
43. No.59 of 1989.
44. Under the 1989 changes, the power of the Minister to grant
refugee status was retained. The Migration Act, s.6A(1) was
amended and renumbered – the various grounds for grant-
ing a visa were transformed from a discretionary system
exercised by the Minister to one governed by the Migration
Regulations 1989. Among the classes of visa were certain
classes of refugee visa. However, the grant of refugee status
(a  contingent criterion [inter alia]  for  being granted a
Refugee Visa and/or Entry Permit) remained at the discre-
tion of the Minister. After amendments to the Migration
Act (effected by the Migration Amendment Act (no 2) 1988
(Cth), the Migration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), and the
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), the pro-
visions of the Migration Act, s.6A became s.47 and read as
follows: “s.47 (1) A permanent entry permit shall not be
granted to a non-citizen after entry into Australia unless at
least one of the following paragraphs applies to the non-
citizen:… (d) he or she is the holder of a valid temporary
permit and the Minster has determined in writing that the
non-citizen has the status of a refugee within the meaning
of:(i) the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees that
was done at Geneva on 28 July 1951; or (ii) the Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees that was done at New York
on 31 January 1967;...”
45. J. Crawford, “Australian Immigration Law and Refugees:
The 1989 Amendments” (1990) International Journal of
Refugee Law [hereinafter IJRL] 626 at 626–27.
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46. These sections have been amended on several occasions by Migra-
tion Amendment Act  1979 (Cth)(No.117 of 1979); Migration
Amendment Act 1983 (Cth)(No.112 of 1983); and Migration
Amendment Act 1987 (Cth)(No. 133 of 1987). They were repealed
and substituted by the Migration Amendment Act (1989) (No. 59
of 1989) as s.6(1), (2), (3) and s.11A respectively. However, as part
of the same amendment, the entire Act was renumbered, after
which s.6(1), (2), (3) became s.14(1), (2) and (3), while s.11A
became s.20. Hereafter, the sections of the Migration Act are
referred to in their post December 1989 amendment numbering,
the pre December 1989 amendment numbers, where applicable,
being referred to in square brackets “ [...]”. It should be noted that
the entire Act was again substantially amended and renumbered
by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) (No. of 1992).
47. The terminology applied to those in Australia without  valid
authority has altered with various changes to the Migration Act
1958. Following passage of the Migration Legislation Amendment
Act (1989) (Cth) (No.59 of 1989) on 19 December 1989, from
then until 1 September 1994, persons arriving in Australia with-
out visas or entry permits were referred to as “prohibited en-
trants”: Migration Act, s.54B and s. 88 [s.36]. Persons who entered
Australia and whose entry permit expired after entry, or their
entry permit was cancelled, became known as “illegal entrants”:
Migration Act, s.14 [s.6(1)] and s.20 [11A] . This was a change
from the term applied under the earlier form the Migration Act,
s.6 which before 2 April 1984 described a person who arrived in
Australia and was refused a valid entry permit, or whose entry
permit was cancelled or expired after entry, as a “prohibited
immigrant,” and after 2 April 1984 as a “prohibited non-citizen.”
Following the passage of the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth)
(No.184 of 1992) and its coming into effect on 1 September 1994
the previous terminology was abandoned. The classification now
differentiates simply between “unlawful non citizens” and “lawful
non citizens” under the Migration Act, s.13 and s.14; supra note 2
and infra note 69.
48. Migration Act, s.88 read: “(1) A person who is on board a vessel
(not being an aircraft) at the time of the arrival of the vessel at a
port, whether or not that port is the first port of call of the vessel
in Australia, being a stowaway or a person whom an authorized
officer reasonably believes to be seeking to enter Australia in
circumstances in which the person would become an illegal en-
trant, (in this section the “prohibited entrant”) may – (a) if an
authorized officer so directs; or (b) if the master of the vessel so
requests and an authorized officer approves, be kept in such
custody as an authorized  officer directs at  such place as  the
authorized officer directs until the departure of the vessel from
its last port of call in Australia or until such earlier time as an
authorized officer directs. (2) Where a person ... who has travelled
to a port in Australia on board a vessel (not being an aircraft),
whether or not that port is the first port of call of the vessel in
Australia, has, after the arrival of the vessel at its first port of call
in Australia, sought and been refused an entry permit, the person
may, if an authorized officer so directs, be kept in such custody as
an authorized officer directs at such place as the authorized officer
directs until the departure of the vessel from its last port of call in
Australia or until such earlier time as an authorized officer
directs." The section was amended and renumbered from
s.36 to become s.88 following passage of the Migration
Legislation Amendment Act (1989) (Cth) (No.59 of 1989).
Following the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) (No.184 of
1992), s.88 was substantially amended and renumbered to
become s.250. The requirement of s.88 that a “prohibited
entrant” “be returned on the boats” on which they had
entered Australian territory was to be crucial in the High
Court consideration of the validity of the Migration Act, s.
88  as empowering the mandatory detention of asylum
seekers: Lim v. MILGEA (1992) 110 ALR 97: supra note 17;
infra note 52.
49. Migration Act, s.92 and s.93.
50. Migration Act, s.13 [s.5J]. The “period of grace” ran from
the time the last entry permit held by the person expired,
but stopped when any valid application for a visa was made,
and only started running when that application was final-
ized: Migration Act, s.13(2).
51. UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/1993 (1993); reproduced in “UN
Human Rights Committee. Communication No 560/1993
A v. Australia” (1997) 9 IJRL at 506–27. In response to the
UN Committee’s finding that Australia was in breach of
some of its obligations under the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR]; infra
note 190) Australia made a veiled threat to withdraw from
the optional protocol which permitted appeals to be taken
to the UN Human Rights Committee; see Australia, “Re-
sponse of the Australian Government to the Views of the
Human Rights Committee in Communication No
560/1993 (A v Australia),” (1997) 9 IJRL at 674–78.
52. This case involved a group of Cambodian asylum seekers
who had arrived in Australia on two separate boats on 27
November 1989 and 31 March 1990. Upon arrival they
were detained under the Migration Act, s.88. Between 3 and
6 April 1992 the applicants’ claims to refugee status were
refused by the Minister. Applications were then made to
the Federal Court under s.15 of the Administrative Deci-
sions (Judicial Review) Act 1997 (Cth) [hereinafter ADJR
Act] on the basis that the detentions were without legal
authority. The Minister conceded the case before it came
to hearing, vacating the decisions and remitting them to
the Department for reassessment, but keeping the appli-
cants in detention in the meantime. For a complete discus-
sion of the case see M. Crock, “Climbing Jacobs Ladder:
The High Court and the Administrative Detention of Asy-
lum Seekers in Australia” (1993) 15 Syd L.R at 338.
53. In the end, it was not necessary for the Court to consider
this second question.
54. No. 24 of 1992. It received the royal assent the following
day. See Crock, supra note 52 at 340.
55. Lim v. MILGEA (1992) 110 ALR 97; at 109 per Brennan,
Deane and Dawson JJ; at 127 per Toohey J; and at 143 per
McHugh J. After examining the legislation in force before
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7 May 1992, five judges held that the detention of the asylum
seekers was or was probably unlawful.
56. Migration Act, s.177 [s.54K] defined a “designated person” as a
“non-citizen who a) had been on a boat in the territorial sea of
Australia after 19 November 1989 and before 1 December 1992
[later amended and extended to 1 September 1994]; and b) has
not presented a visa; and c) is in Australia; and d) has not been
granted an entry permit; and e) is a person to whom the Depart-
ment has given a designation by: i) determining and recording
which boat he or she was on; ii) giving him or her an identifier
that is not the same identifier as an identifier given to another
non-citizen who was on the boat; and includes a non-citizen born
in Australia whose mother is a designated person.” See Crock,
supra note 52 at 340.
57. Excluding certain days such as those spent waiting for visa proc-
essing, attending hearings, etc.
58. HREOC, supra note 6 at 23–24.
59. Lim v MILGEA (1992) 110 ALR 97 at 120–21.
60. Ibid. at 115 per Brennan Deane and Dawson JJ.
61. Ibid. at 114–15.
62. That the Parliament had decided it is in the national interest for
“designated persons” to be kept in detention until they leave
Australia or be granted a visa.
63. Lim v. MILGEA (1992) 110 ALR 97 at 100 per Mason CJ; at 113
per Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ; at 128 per Toohey J; at 135
per Gaudron; at 143–44 per McHugh J.
64. Ibid. at 100 per Mason CJ; at 117–18 per Brennan Deane and
Dawson JJ; at 128 per Toohey J; at 135 per Gaudron; at 143–44
per McHugh J.
65. Senator Nick Bolkus & Joanna McRae v. Tang Jia Xin (1993) 47
FCR 176; (1993) 118 ALR 603 where the Full Court of the Federal
Court upheld the decision of the judge at first instance to order
the release of the detainee because the period of detention had
exceeded the maximum number of days permitted by the Migra-
tion Act.
66. This case, and the attempts by the government to legislate itself
out of the difficulty of having illegally detained people, shows how
far the government was prepared to go to maintain its detention
policy,  even  to the  extent of legalizing it retrospectively and
attempting to remove all judicial intervention or oversight of the
detention regime.
67. No.184 of 1992. It came into force on 1 September  1994.  It
repealed and substituted large parts of the Migration Act and
renumbered it. Hereinafter, the section numbers cited are those
post 1 September 1994, and the section numbers pre 1 September
1994 (where applicable) as introduced by the Reform Act 1992 are
cited in square brackets “[..]”.
68. The prescription was changed from “temporary” visa to a non-de-
fined temporal phrase “visas” by the Migration Legislation
Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) s 9.
69. Migration Act, s. 14 reads: “An unlawful non citizen is: (1) A non
citizen in the migration zone who is not a lawful non citizen is an
unlawful non citizen. (2) To avoid doubt, a non citizen in the
migration zone who, immediately before 1 September 1994, was
an illegal entrant within the meaning of the Migration Act as in
force then became, on that date, an unlawful non citizen.”
For “migration zone,” infra, note 71.
70. Supra notes 2 and 69. See M. Crock, “A Legal Perspective
on the Evolution of Mandatory Detention” in M Crock ed.,
Protection or Punishment: The Detention of Asylum Seekers
in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 1993) Chapter 5
passim; Joint Standing Committee on Migration [herein-
after JSCM], Asylum, Border Control and Detention (Can-
berra: AGPS 1994) at 49ff.
71. The “migration zone” is defined by Migration Act, s.5(1) to
include land above or below the low watermark and sea
within the limits of a port in a state or territory but does not
include the sea within a state or territory or the “territorial
sea” of Australia. The migration zone includes Christmas
Island and Ashmore Reef (Migration Act, s.7). The “migra-
tion zone” is a creation of Australian domestic law, not
international law.
72. Migration Act, s.189(2).
73. Migration Act, s.190.
74. Migration Act, s.192.
75. Migration Act, s.196(5).
76. Migration Act, s.199.
77. JSCM, supra note 70 at 49ff. The need to ameliorate the
system was also supported by the severe criticisms of the
law by numerous bodies, a view later vindicated by the UN
Human Rights Committee in 1997 in a case brought before
it by one of the plaintiffs in Lim v. MILGEA (1992): A v.
Australia 30 April 1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993:
supra note 51.
78. Migration Act, s.73.
79. 1994 Regulations, reg. 2.20(2) and (3).
80. 1994 Regulations, reg. 2.20(5) and reg. 2.20(7): if the state
or territory child welfare authority has certified that release
from detention is in the child’s best interests and also that
the Immigration Minister is satisfied that arrangements
have been made for the child’s care and welfare, these
arrangements are in the child’s best interests and release
would not prejudice the rights and interests of the child’s
parents or guardian.
81. 1994 Regulations, reg. 2.20(4).
82. 1994 Regulations, reg. 2.20(8).
83. Based either on health or on previous experience of torture
or trauma; the test is whether the person can be properly
cared for in a detention environment: 1994 Regulations,
reg. 2.20(9).
84. Migration Act, s.72(3). The power to make a determination
is stipulated to be exercisable only by the Minister if: the
person has made a valid application for a Protection Visa;
the person has been in detention for more than six months
since the visa application was made; the Minister has not
yet made a primary decision (that is, the conclusion of the
first stage of the formal refugee determination process) in
relation to the visa application; and the Minister thinks
release would be in the public interest: The Migration Act,
s.72(2).
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85. HREOC, “Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee inquiry into Australia’s refugee and hu-
manitarian program” (November 2001) at 7; online: HREOC
Homepage <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/ word/human_rights/asy-
lum_seekers/h5_2_3.doc> (date accessed:  20 February 2002).
The government claims that separating children from their par-
ents is not in the best interests of the child, and since there is no
power to release the parents, the children ipso facto should remain
in detention. As at 1 February 2002, there is one child in foster
care having been released on a bridging visa: Press information
page, Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, “Women and
Children in Detention”; online: Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP Homepage <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/
detention/women_ &_children.htm> (date accessed: 24 March
2002).
86. Amended by Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth)
(No. 60 of 1994).
87. Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) (No.60 of 1994)
repealed and substituted s.54ZA which thence became s.193.
88. Migration Act, s. 256 reads: “Where a person is in immigration
detention under this Act, the person responsible for his or her
immigration  detention shall,  at the  request of the person in
immigration detention, give to him or her application forms for
a visa or afford to him or her all reasonable facilities for making
a statutory declaration for the purposes of this Act or for obtain-
ing legal advice or taking legal proceedings in relation to his or
her immigration detention.”
89. S. Taylor, “Should Unauthorised Arrivals in Australia have free
Access to Advice and Assistance” (2000) 6(1) Australian Journal
of Human Rights [hereinafter AJHR] 34 at 43.
90. Effected by the passage of Migration Legislation Amendment Act
(No.1)(1999)(No.89 of 1999).
91. S. Taylor, “Protecting Human Rights of Immigration Detainees in
Australia: An Evaluation of Current Accountability Mechanisms”
(2000) 22(1) Syd. L.R. 62; M. Phillips, “Impact of Being Detained
On-Shore: The Plight of Asylum Seekers in Australia” (2000)
23(3) UNSW L.J. 288–302 at 290; DIMIA, supra note 2 at 8.
92. The Company is Australian Correctional Services Pty Ltd. The
government claims that: “Detention centres are not open to
unrestricted access by the public because of the need to protect
potential refugees and the family and friends they have left be-
hind. Indeed, many detainees seek anonymity.” DIMIA, supra
note 2 at 12.
93. Between 1990 and November 1999 there were fifty-eight com-
plaints made to the Human Rights Commission: HREOC,
1998–1999 Review of Immigration Detention Centres (Canberra
2000) at 2; online: HREOC Homepage <http://www.hreoc.
gov.au/word/human_rights/asylum_seekers/idc_review.doc>
(date accessed: 22 February 2002).
94. HREOC, supra note 6 at 23–24.
95. Ibid. at 24.
96. HREOC, supra note 85 at 3–5.
97. Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (No. 1) (Cth) (No. 89
of 1999).
98. Schloenhardt, supra note 20 at 52.
99. 1994 Regulations, reg. 785.212 state that the applicant for
a Temporary Protection Visa has entered the migration
zone but has not been immigration cleared; infra note
101.
100. 1994 Regulations, reg. 866.212 limits application for a
Subclass 866 (Protection) Visa to those who have been
immigration cleared. Reg. 866.228 prevents a person who
has been granted a Subclass 785 (Temporary Protection)
Visa from being granted a Subclass 860 (Protection) Visa
unless they have held that temporary visa for a period of
thirty months continuously. HREOC has stated its con-
cern  that these changes discriminate between asylum
seekers, and is contrary to international Conventions,
such as Article 26 of the ICCPR (infra note 190), and
Article 2(1) of the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child [hereinafter CROC] (infra note 191), and
Articles 31–32 of the Refugee Convention: HREOC, Brief-
ing Paper: Human Rights and International Law implica-
tions  of Migration Bills (21 September 2001); online:
HREOC Homepage <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/hu-
man_rights/ asylum_seekers/migration_bills.html>
(date accessed: 20 February 2002).
101. 1994 Regulations, reg. 785.511 permits the holder of the
visa (when granted) to remain in, but not re-enter, Aus-
tralia until the end of thirty-six months from the date of
grant of the visa; or until the day on which an application
by the holder for a permanent visa is finally determined,
whichever is later. Importantly, Regulation 785.611 for-
bids the holder from being granted a substantive visa
other than a Subclass 866 Protection Visa.
102. 1994 Regulations, reg. 785.222 permits a member of the
family unit as a person granted a Subclass 785 (Tempo-
rary Protection) Visa to apply for a Temporary Protection
Visa; however, reg. 785.411 requires that family member
must be in Australia at the time the decision is made to
grant the visa.
103. On 26 August 2001 a boat which had stalled near Austra-
lian territory carrying 433 asylum seekers was spotted by
Coastwatch. The next day, a Norwegian freighter, the MV
Tampa responded to a call by the Australian Search and
Rescue (AusSAR) to render assistance. After taking the
asylum seekers on board, it is alleged that the captain of
the MV Tampa, Arne Rinnan, turned towards Christmas
Island after the passengers requested him to do so. Capt.
Rinnan later stated that the Indonesian authorities denied
him permission to enter Indonesian territory. The Aus-
tralian authorities also denied the boat permission to
enter Australian territory, ordering the MV Tampa to
remain in the “contiguous zone.” Since no assistance had
been forthcoming within forty-eight hours, the captain
ordered a distress signal to be sent and on 29 August 2001
he steered the ship into Australian territorial waters near
Christmas Island. The ship was intercepted by forty-five
SAS members. The government attempted to pass a Bor-
der Protection Bill through Parliament legalizing its ac-
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tions, but this bill was rejected by the Senate. A stalemate ensued
for several days during which the ship was anchored off Christ-
mas Island. The Norwegian Ambassador to Australia visited the
ship on 30 August 2001. On 31 August 2001 two applications
were made to the Federal Court of Australia, the Victorian
Council for Civil Liberties Incorporated v. MIMA [2001] FCA
1297 and Ruddock v. Vidarlis [2001] FCA 1329; (2001) 110 FCR
391; (2001) 183 ALR 1 [online: AusTLII Homepage
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/>]  (infra note 226), seeking re-
straining orders preventing the Commonwealth and the Minis-
ter from removing the asylum seekers from the territorial sea.
On 3 September 2001 the asylum seekers were forcibly removed
to the HMAS Manoora on which they were eventually trans-
ported to Nauru where the government had established a deten-
tion centre where the asylum seekers would be processed by the
UNHCR. Before they arrived, the HMAS Warramanga inter-
cepted on 7 September 2001 another vessel, later identified as
the Indonesian fishing vessel, the Aceng, which was heading for
Ashmore Reef. This boat was boarded by Australian authorities
and the passengers were transferred to the HMAS Manoora, in
which these people were also transhipped eventually to Nauru.
104. HREOC, supra note 100: “The provisions of the Amendment
Bills are of great concern to the Commission … . It is the
Commission’s view that the provisions of the Amendment Bills
undermine Australia’s commitment to international human
rights obligations.” These laws included the Border Protection
(Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (No. 126 of 2001)
[hereinafter BP(VEP) Act] which introduced into the Migration
Act s.7A, which expressly re-enforces the right of the Common-
wealth to exercise its executive power to “protect Australia’s
borders, where necessary, by ejecting persons who have crossed
those borders”; the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migra-
tion Zone) Act 2001 (No. 127 of 2001) [hereinafter the
MA(EMZ) Act]; the Migration Amendment (Excision from Mi-
gration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (No. 128 of
2001) [hereinafter the MA (EMZ) CP Act]; the Migration Legis-
lation Amendment Act (No. 5) 2001 (No. 130 of 2001) which
empowers officers under the Migration Act to obtain informa-
tion from agencies, both private and public, about the travel to
and from Australia of individuals without reaching the terms of
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); and the Migration Legislation
Amendment Act (No. 6) 2001 (No. 131 of 2001). In considering
Australia’s actions against the MV Tampa, one should keep in
mind the requirements of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 10 October 1982, 1833 UNTS 1994 No 34 [Ratified by
Australia  5 October 1994,  entry into force for Australia 16
November 1994] Article 98, which requires signatory states to
ensure that the master of a ship sailing under its flag render
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost and
to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in
distress if informed of their need of assistance.
105. Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s.185(3A), introduced by schedule 1,
Item 3, BP(VEP)Act 2001; and the Migration Act 1958,
s.245F(9), introduced by schedule 2, Item 8, BP(VEP) Act 2001.
Furthermore, the MA(EMZ)(CP) Act 2001 inserts into the Mi-
gration Act a new s.198A which empowers an officer of
the Commonwealth to take an offshore entry person
from Australia to a country declared under the provisions
of the Migration Act at subsection 198A(3). Before re-
moving a person to a third country, the Minister must
declare in writing that a country specified provides access
for persons seeking asylum to effective procedures for
assessing their protection needs; provides protection for
person seeking asylum pending determination of their
refugee status; provides protection to persons who are
given refugee status, pending their voluntary repatriation
to their  country of origin or resettlement in another
country; and meets relevant human rights standards in
providing that protection.
106. Even though present in Australian territory, in order to
make a valid application for a Protection Visa a person
must be in Australia in the “Australian migration zone”
1994  Regulations at Schedule  1  – an  area defined by
legislation in the Migration Act, s.5(1): supra note 71. The
Migration Act, s.36 stipulates that a criterion for a Protec-
tion Visa is that the applicant for the visa is a “non-citizen
in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations
under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refu-
gees Protocol” [emphasis added]. The Migration Act does
not define what “in Australia” signifies [“enter in Austra-
lia” is defined in s.5(1) as “enter the migration zone”].
The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s. 17 states that
“Australia” means “the Commonwealth of Australia and,
when used in a geographical sense, includes the Territory
of Christmas Island”. It also includes the “coastal sea of
Australia” (s.15B(1)(b)) and this in itself includes the
“territorial sea” (s.15B(4)). It would thus appear that
Australia owes protection obligations to a refugee who
has entered the territorial sea; i.e., a person is entitled to
make a valid claim for refugee status under the Refugees
Convention if they have entered the territorial sea of
Australia, regardless of whether they are in the “migration
zone” as defined by the Migration Act. But without being
in the migration zone, it is not possible to apply for a
Protection Visa. The MA(EMZ) Act (supra note 104), s.1
removed certain places from the migration zone by
amending the Migration Act, s.5(1) so as to define an
“excised offshore place” as including “the territory of
Christmas island; the territory of Ashmore and Cartier
Islands; the territory of Cocos (Keeling) Islands; any other
external territory that is prescribed by the regulations for
the purposes of the subsection; any island that forms part
of a State or Territory and is prescribed for the purposes
of the subsection; Australian sea installations; and Aus-
tralian resource installations.” Asylum seekers in Austra-
lian territory  may  find themselves in the anomalous
position that even though Australia may owe protection
obligations to them under the Refugees Convention,
there is no mechanism for them to have this status recog-
nized by applying for a Protection Visa.
Volume 20 Refuge Number 3

107. MA (EMZ) Act 2001 schedule 1, Item 3, inserts into the Migra-
tion Act, s.5(1) the definition of “excised offshore place” and
“offshore entry person”; HREOC, supra note 100. The
MA(EMZ) Act 2001 also inserts into the Migration Act a new
s.46A which provides that an application for a visa (including a
Protection Visa) by an “offshore entry person” (i.e., a person
who has entered an “excised offshore place” after the excision
time for that place) will not be valid if that person is “in Austra-
lia” and is “an unlawful non-citizen” (s.46A(1)); i.e., the person
has entered Australia (its territorial waters) and has entered
what would be (if it were not for the excision of that place) the
“migration zone”. The Migration Act, s.46A(2) (introduced to
the Migration Act by MA(EMZ) Act 2001, Schedule 1, Item 4)
grants the Minister a discretionary power to allow an applica-
tion made by a particular offshore entry person for a particular
class of visa if he thinks it is in the public interest to do so.
108. Migration Act, s.189 introduced by MA(EMZ)(CP) Act 2001,
Schedule 1, Item 4. Such people are not offshore entry persons.
109. Migration Act, s.198(4) introduced by MA (EMZ)(CP) Act 2001
Schedule 1, Item 6.
110. Customs Act 1901, s.185(3AA) introduced by BP(VEP) Act 2001,
Schedule 1, Item 3. Officers acting under this subsection are
immune under s.185(3AB) from prosecution provided they act
in good faith and use no more force than is authorized by the
Customs Act 1901, s.185(3b).
111. Customs Act 1901, s.185AA introduced by BP(VEP) Act 2001,
Schedule 1, Item 4.
112. “Ineligibility period” is defined to mean the period from the time
of the offshore entry until the time when the person next ceases
to be an unlawful non-citizen: Migration Act, s.494AA(4) intro-
duced by MA(EMZ)(CP) Act 2001, Schedule 1, Item 7.
113. Migration Act, s.494AA introduced by MA (EMZ)(CP) Act 2001,
Schedule 1, Item 7.
114. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 74: Unauthorised Arrivals by Air and Sea,
Public Affairs Section DIMIA. Revised 8 November 2001; online
DIMIA Homepage <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/74unau-
thorised.htm> (date accessed: 20 February 2002).
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Refugee Council of Australia [hereinafter RCOA], The Size and
Composition of the 2000–2001 Humanitarian Program: Views
from the Community Sector (February 2000) at 50; Immigration
Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note 18 at 3–4.
118. For  analysis of the figures of unauthorized arrivals, refugee
applicants, those approved, those rejected, etc., for the period
between 1989 and 1999, see Schloenhardt, supra note 20 at
41–43.
119. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 74, supra note 114. This Fact Sheet contains
a list of boats and a breakdown of the passengers between
November 1989 and 22 August 2001.
120. Ibid.; Migration Act, s.250.
121. Ibid.
122. The difference in the figures between the numbers of people
admitted to the IDCs and the actual numbers held in detention
at any given time fluctuates according to various factors, such
as how many are processed, released, or removed from
Australia, the number of unlawful arrivals, etc.
123. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 70: Border Control, Public Affairs Sec-
tion DIMIA. Revised 19 November 2001; online: DIMIA
Homepage <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/doc/70bor-
der.doc> (date accessed, 22 February 2002).
124. DIMIA Fact Sheet 82: Immigration detention, Public Af-
fairs Section DIMIA. Revised 19 November 2001; on-
line: DIMIA Homepage <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/
doc/82detention.doc>.
125. The Minister for Immigration is appointed as the guard-
ian of unaccompanied minors who arrive in Australia
unlawfully: Immigration (Guardianship of Children Act
1946 (Cth) s.6.
126. Press  information page, Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, supra note 85.
127. Despite carefully perusing the DIMIA Homepage
<http://www.immi.gov.au> (date accessed: 20 February
2002 and 24 March 2002), I was unable to find any
information regarding the exact figures of those detained
offshore in Christmas Island, Manus Island, and Nauru.
128. Press  information page, Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, “Frequently Asked Questions – Deten-
tion”; on-line: Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock
MP Homepage <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/faq/
detention.htm> (date accessed: 24 March 2002).
129. Ibid.
130. DIMIA, supra note 2: “Once detained, the period of time
it takes for applications to progress through the refugee
determination process and, hence, the period of deten-
tion is minimised.” And again: “The majority of people
in immigration detention are only held for a short time.
Significant measures have been introduced to improve the
speed and effectiveness of the decision-making process.”
131. Press  information page, Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, supra note 10.
132. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 70, supra note 123; also DIMIA, Fact
Sheet 64: Temporary Protection Visas, Public Affairs Sec-
tion DIMIA, Canberra, 14 November 2001; on-line:
DIMIA Homepage <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/doc/
75processing.doc> (date accessed: 22 February 2002).
133. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 75: Processing Unlawful Boat Arrivals.
Public Affairs Section, DIMIA, Canberra, 14 November
2001; on-line DIMIA Homepage <http://www.immi.
gov.au/facts/doc/75processing.doc>. (date accessed: 22
February 2002).
134. Ibid.
135. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 82, supra note 124; and DIMIA, Fact
Sheet 70, supra note 123.
136. I.e., those who have arrived by air without valid documen-
tation or have been refused entry clearance to Australia, or
have been immigration cleared but have overstayed the
validity period of their visas or their visas have been can-
celled due to breach of conditions.
137. DIMIA Fact Sheet 70, supra note 123.
Australia’s Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers

138. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 82, supra note 124.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Although the writer knows of two separate incidents in 2000
where lawyers were denied entry to the IDC by ACS to speak to
detainee clients concerning Protection Visa applications unless
the solicitor concerned divulged to the officer the content of
what would be discussed between them and the detainee.
142. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 82, supra note 124. Press information page,
Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note 10.
143. HREOC, supra note 8. Migration Act, s.193(2); see supra note 91.
144. Ibid.
145. Press information page, Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock
MP, supra note 10.
146. Supra note 12.
147. The Sydney Morning Herald (4 May 2001) 6.
148. For an examination of the impact detention has on asylum
seekers, Phillips, supra note 89. For more expert opinions, see
A. Burnett and M. Peel, “Health Needs of Asylum Seekers and
Refugees” (2001) 322 British Medical Journal at 544–47; D.
Silove, Z. Steel and R. F. Mollica, “Detention of Asylum Seekers:
Assault on Health, Human Rights, and Social Development”
(2001) 357 The Lancet at 1436–37. The effects in terms of the
effect of detention in the Australian context, see Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade [hereinafter
JSCFADT], A Report on Visits to Immigration Detention Centres
(Canberra: AGP 18 June 2001) Chapter 7 passim; online: at
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfad t/IDCVisits/
IDCindex.htm> (date accessed, 24 March 2002).
149. R. Julian, “Invisible Subjects and the Victimized Self: Settlement
Experiences of Refugee Women in Australia” in R. Lentin, ed.,
Gender and Catastrophe (London & New York: Zed Books,
1997) at 196–210; R. Zetter, “Labelling Refugees: Forming and
Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity” (1991) Journal of Refu-
gee Studies [hereinafter JRS] 4(1); Phillips, supra note 89 at 291.
150. Supra note 10.
151. JSCFADT, supra note 148, Chapter 7, at 7.21: Symptoms of
psychological distress are common in asylum seekers and refu-
gees, people may show symptoms of depression and anxiety,
panic attacks or agoraphobia; poor sleep patterns are almost
universal but may not be described spontaneously; hostile me-
dia reports have not nurtured good relationships with the com-
munity. At 7.24: Women are more likely than men to report
poor health and depression. They may be lonely and isolated but
often welcome the opportunity to belong to a support group. At
7.25: Children may have arrived alone and may be living with
unfamiliar carers. They may have developmental difficulties,
seeming to be mature beyond their years. While they may show
problems such as anxiety and nightmares, few need psychiatric
treatment.
152. Phillips, supra note 89 at 294–95. JSCFADT, supra note 148 at
7.21.
153. HREOC, supra note 6.
154. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 8.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.
157. Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note 18
at 3.
158. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 75, supra note 133; DIMA, supra note
2 at 3.
159. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 3.
160. Ibid. at 5.
161. Minister for Immigration, P. Ruddock, “Australian state-
ment to parties to the convention related to the status of
refugees UNHCR Ministerial Council” (Geneva, 12 De-
cember 2001); online: DIMIA Homepage
<http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/transcripts/transcr
ipts01/ refugees_121201.htm> (date accessed: 20 Febru-
ary 2002).
162. M. Kingston, “Politics and Public Opinion” in M. Crock,
ed., Protection or Punishment ?: The Detention of Asylum
Seekers in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 1993) 9;
also Phillips, supra note 80 at 290.
163. Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note
161.
164. A. Clennell & C. Skehan, “I knew story was false but didn’t
tell PM, Reith admits” The Sydney Morning Herald (22
February 2002). This refers to the allegations made by the
Minister for Immigration and the Prime Minister in the
days before the federal election in November 2001 that
asylum seekers had thrown their children into the ocean
when intercepted by RAN vessels. It emerged from the
Navy about two days before the election that the story was
not true, and recently, the former Minister of Defence,
Mr. Reith, admitted he knew for three days the story was
untrue but did nothing to correct the story in the public
mind.
165. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 3.
166. Press  information page, Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, supra note 10.
167. Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note 18
at 5–6.
168. Ibid. 6.
169. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 75, supra note 133.
170. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 70, supra note 123; DIMIA, Fact Sheet
82, supra note 124.
171. Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note 18
at 4–5.
172. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 70, supra note 123. Also Fact Sheet 74,
supra note 114; Fact Sheet 75, supra note 133; and DIMIA,
Fact Sheet 73, People smuggling and Fact Sheet 71, New
measures to strengthen border control (Canberra: Public
Affairs Section DIMIA, 28 September 2001); online:
DIMIA Homepage <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/doc/
71newmeasures.doc>.
173. Ibid.
174. Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note
161. The government, and Minister Ruddock himself,
have accused those who are opposed to mandatory deten-
tion and deterrence strategies  as  “supporting  people
Volume 20 Refuge Number 3

smuggling:” M. Saunders, “Refugee Video Sparks Row” The
Weekend Australian (17–18 June 2000).
175. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 75, supra note 133.
176. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 3; also, Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, supra note 18 at 7.
177. A phrase drawn from the game of cricket, which is renowned for
its “fairness.” “Not to abide by the umpire’s decision” suggests
that one is not playing in a sportsmanlike manner and is not
“playing fair.”
178. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 6–7. Migration Act, Part 8, substituted
by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act
2001, Schedule 1, Item 7.
179. This does not mean “according to government policy” – since
the government must also abide by the rule of law – although
this distinction seems to be lost on the government itself.
180. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 6: “Many unauthorised arrivals have
disposed of their identity documents en route to Australia.
Establishing the identity of these people can take considerable
time but it is essential to determine whether Australia owes them a
protection obligation.” Legislation which commenced in October
2001 allows the Minister or other approved decision maker to draw
adverse inferences about the veracity of the person’s claimed iden-
tity, nationality or citizenship if that person refuses to provide
identitydocumentswithoutreasonableexplanation:MigrationAct,
s..91V and s.91W as introduced by Migration Legislation
Amendment Act (No. 6) 2001 (No.131 of 2001), Schedule 1,
Item 5.
181. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 6–7. Immigration Minister, Philip Rud-
dock MP, supra note 18 at 8.
182. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 6–7.
183. Ibid.
184. Press information page, Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock
MP, supra note 10.
185. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 6–7.
186. Ibid.: “The majority of people in immigration detention are only
held for a short time. Significant measures have been introduced
to improve the speed and effectiveness of the decision-making
process.”
187. For a comprehensive survey of the position regarding detention
and penalization of asylum seekers see G. S. Goodwin Gill,
“Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention and Protection,” a pa-
per prepared at the request of the Department of International
Protection for the UNHCR Global Consultations October 2001;
online: UNCHR Homepage: <Http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/global-consultations > (date accessed: 24 March
2002).
188. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Na-
tions General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (10 December
1948).
189. According to Lauterpacht, at the time the UDHR was pro-
claimed there was a consensus among the member states of the
UN that the Declaration did not impose upon them any duties
or legal obligations with respect to its content: H. Lauterpacht,
“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” (1948) 25 Brit-
ish Year Book of International Law 354 at 373–74. Fifty
years later, there is general consensus that the provisions
of the UDHR have become part of general international
law principles: I. Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1985) at 570–71. In any event, contravention of the prin-
ciples contained in the UDHR is, at the very least, morally
reprehensible.
190. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19
December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, A.T.S. 1980 No. 23
(entered into force generally [except Article 41] 23 March
1976. Entered into force for Australia [except Article 41]
13 November 1980. Article 41 came into force generally
28 March 1979 and for Australia 28 January 1993).
191. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, A.T.S 1991 No.4 (entered into force
generally 2 September 1990. Signed for Australia 22 Au-
gust 1990. Instrument of ratification, with reservation to
Article 37(c) regarding separate imprisonment, depos-
ited for Australia 17 December 1990. Entered into force
for Australia 16 January 1991).
192. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85, A.T.S 1989 No.21 (entered into force
generally 26 June 1987 (including Articles 21 and 22).
Signed for Australia 10 December 1985. Instrument of
ratification deposited for Australia 8 August 1989. En-
tered into force for Australia 7 September 1989. Declara-
tion of acceptance of Articles 21 and 22 deposited for
Australia 28 January 1993 with effect from that date).
193. Refugees Convention, Article 31.
194. Press  information page, Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, supra note 10.
195. This is a position that Australia has taken for some years.
With respect to the UNHCR Executive Committee, Con-
clusions No. 58 (XL) – 1989 : The Problem of Refugees and
Asylum Seekers who Move in an Irregular Manner from a
Country in which They had already found Protection, the
following “interpretative declaration or reservation” was
made by the delegation of Australia, that “…Australia
wishes it to be pointed out that its endorsement of the
draft conclusions is subject to it being clearly understood
that refugees and asylum seekers should not necessarily
be afforded the same treatment”. See Report of the 40th
Session of the Executive Committee: UN doc.
A/AC.96/737, part N, p.23.
196. The Senate Legal and Constitutional References Commit-
tee, Sanctuary Under Review: An Inquiry into Australia’s
refugee and humanitarian program (Canberra: AGPS,
June 2000) was not an inquiry into the detention system
as some advocates had called for. The Committee was
clear on this in the introductory comments: “the legiti-
macy or otherwise of the policy of detaining illegal arri-
vals…are not within the terms of reference of this
inquiry.” However, the report did make recommenda-
Australia’s Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers

tions critical of the government’s restriction of information flow
to asylum seekers and recommended that more information be
provided to onshore asylum seekers concerning the making of
protection applications, in preparing their claims, in receiving
legal advice, and in having legal aid for initial advice on judicial
reviews. It also recommended that the entire system of protec-
tion determination be reviewed in order to see whether an
entirely judicial system or determination would be preferable to
the administrative system currently in place. See HREOC, Re-
port on the Human Rights Commissioner’s Visit to Curtin IRPC
in July 2000 ; online HREOC Homepage <http://www.hreoc.gov.
au/human_rights/asylum_seekers/index.html> (date accessed:
22 February 2002); – reiterated view that detention transgresses
Australia’s human rights obligations citing: the continued re-
fusal to advise new arrivals of their right to request legal assis-
tance (HREOC Immigration Detention Guidelines, March 2000)
[hereinafter HREOC Guidelines] section 2.1; online HREOC
Homepage, <http://www. hreoc.gov.au/ human_rights/asylum/
idc_guidelines> (date accessed: 21 February 2002); the alleged
failure to provide legal assistance upon request to some indi-
viduals who have been “screened in” to the asylum application
process (HREOC Guidelines section 4.4); the inappropriateness
of the detention environment for children; the practice of refer-
ring to detainees predominantly by number rather than by their
given or proper names; the inadequacy of clothing and bedding
provided to detainees (HREOC Guidelines sections 9.1, 9.5 and
9.6); the inadequacy of phone lines and of access for lawyers and
others needing to contact detainees (HREOC Guidelines sec-
tions 3.6 and 4.1); concerns about access to health services, with
particular concerns expressed about the availability of dental
and ophthalmology services (HREOC Guidelines Part 13). See
supra note 8.
197. EXComm Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986: Detention of
Refugees and Asylum Seekers, Report of the 37th Session: UN
doc. A/AC.96/688, para. 128: Recommendation (d).
198. Ibid. at Recommendation (e). See also HREOC, supra note 85 at
4–5.
199. EXComm Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986, supra note 197,
Recommendation (d). See also ExComm Conclusion No. 22
(XXXII) – 1981: Protection of Asylum Seekers in Situations of
Large-scale Influx, Report of the 32nd Session: UN doc.
A/AC.96/601, para. 57(2). UNHCR, Revised Guidelines on Ap-
plicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asy-
lum Seekers (Geneva: February 1999); available online: UNHCR
Homepage <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/global-
consultations > (date accessed: 24 March 2002), Guideline 3:
Exceptional Grounds of Detention.
200. EXComm Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986, supra note 197.
201. UNHCR, supra note 199.
202. Ibid. Guideline 1.
203. Ibid. Guideline 3: “(i) to verify identity; (ii) to determine the
elements on which the claim for refugee status or asylum is
based; (iii) in cases where asylum-seekers have destroyed their
travel and /or identity documents or have used fraudulent docu-
ments in order to mislead the authorities of the State, in which
they intend to claim asylum; and (iv) to protect national
security and public order.”
204. Ibid. Guideline 3; also ExComm Conclusion No. 58 (XL) –
1989: The Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers who
Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in which
They had already found Protection; Report of the 40th
Session of the Executive Committee: UN doc.
A/AC.96/737, part N, p.23.” at (h): “The problem of
irregular movements is compounded by the use, by a
growing number of refugees and asylum seekers, of
fraudulent documentation and their practice of wilfully
destroying or disposing of travel and/or other documents
in order to mislead the authorities of their country of
arrival. These practices complicate the personal identifi-
cation of the person concerned and the determination of
the country where he stayed prior to arrival, and the
nature and duration of his stay in such a country. Prac-
tices of this kind are fraudulent and may weaken the case
of the person concerned; (i) It is recognized that circum-
stances may compel a refugee or asylum seeker to have
recourse to fraudulent documentation when leaving a
country in which his physical safety or freedom are en-
dangered. Where no such compelling circumstances ex-
ist, the use of fraudulent documentation is unjustified; (j)
The wilful destruction or disposal of travel or other docu-
ments by refugees and asylum seekers upon arrival in
their country of destination, in order to mislead the na-
tional authorities as to their previous stay in another
country where they have protection, is unacceptable. Ap-
propriate arrangements should be made by States, either
individually or in co-operation with other States, to deal
with this growing phenomenon.”
205. ExComm Conclusion No. 58 (XL) at (f): “Where refugees
and asylum seekers nevertheless move in an irregular
manner from a country where they have already found
protection, they may be returned to that country if (i)
they are protected there against refoulement and (ii) they
are permitted to remain there and to be treated in accord-
ance with recognized basic human standards until a du-
rable solution is found for them.”
206. UNHCR, supra note 199 at Guideline 2.
207. ExComm Conclusions No. 15 (XXX) – 1979 : Refugees
without an Asylum Country, Report of the 30th Session:
UN doc. A/AC.96/572, para. 72(2)] General Principles
(h)(iv), and (k).
208. See also Note on International Protection, 15 August 1988:
UN  Doc.  A/AC.96/713, paragraph 19. Also, HREOC,
supra note 106 at 4–5.
209. UNHCR, supra note 199, Guideline 3 (4).
210. Established pursuant to Resolution 1991/42.
211. Commission on Human Rights, UN doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1997/50, 15 April 1997. See also the Report
of the Working Group: UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/44, 19
December 1997; E/CN.4/RES/1998/ 41, 17 April 1998.
Volume 20 Refuge Number 3

212. Report of the Working Group, UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/63, 18
December 1999, paragraph 69 (fourteen guarantees).
213. Commission on Human Rights: United Nations Working
Group on Arbitrary, Detention Deliberation No. 5: Situation
regarding immigrants and asylum seekers, UN doc.
E/CN.4/2000/4, 28 December 1999, Annex II relating to the
situation of immigrants and asylum seekers and guarantees
concerning persons held in custody. The Declaration was noted
by the Commission on Human Rights in Resolutions 2001/40,
23 April 2001 and 2000/36, 20 April 2000.
214. HREOC, supra note 85 at 3.
215. Migration Act s.189 and s. 196.
216. HREOC, supra note 85 at 4.
217. UN Human Rights Committee, A v Australia, Communication
No. 560/1993. Views of the Human Rights Committee, 30 April
1997: UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993. Reproduced in UN
Human Rights Committee. Communication No 560/1993 A v
Australia (1997) 9 IJRL at 506–27.
218. HREOC, Report on Visit to Curtin, supra note 196.
219. A v. Australia, supra notes 51 and 217. The Committee stated:
“remand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not
necessary in all the circumstances of the case, for example to
prevent flight or interference with evidence: the element of
proportionality becomes relevant in this context.”
220. UNHCR, supra note 199, Guideline 5.
221. HREOC, supra note 85 at 4–5.
222. HREOC, Report on Visit to Curtin, supra note 196.
223. Veen v. The Queen (No.2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, Mason CJ,
Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ at 472; HREOC, Report on Visit
to Curtin, supra note 196.
224. Torres v. Finland, Communication No. 291/1988. View adopted
2 April 1990, Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol II,
Supplement No.40: UN Doc. A45/40, page 96; HREOC, supra
note 85 at 8.
225. HREOC, supra note 85 at 4–5.
226. UNHCR, supra note 199, Guideline 3.
227. Note Ruddock v. Vadarlis, [2001] FCA 1329; (2001) 110 FCR
491; (2001) 183 ALR 1; online: AusTLII Homepage
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/>. In response to the MV Tampa
incident, applications were filed, Vadarlis claiming, inter alia,
that the asylum seekers were being unlawfully detained by the
government, and seeking writs of habeas corpus. The writs were
granted; release was ordered to the mainland. On appeal by the
Minister, a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court of
Australia held that actions of the Australian government did not
amount to detention, such as to attract the remedy of habeas
corpus. The majority of the Court, per French J, held that the
actions of the government had been incidental to preventing the
rescued from landing on Australian territory, “where they had
no right to go,” (paragraph 193), while the asylum seekers’
inability to go elsewhere derived from circumstances “which did
not come from any action on the part of the Commonwealth.”
This was especially so since it was the captain of the Tampa who
refused to sail from Australian waters while the asylum seekers
were on board his boat (paragraph 202). Chief Justice Black
dissented. His Honour concluded that actual detention
and complete loss of freedom is not necessary to found
the issue of the writ of habeas corpus (paragraph 69).
Moreover, whether a detainee had a right to enter was not
relevant; the real issue was whether there were reasonable
means of egress open to the rescued people such that
detention should not be held to exist (paragraph 79);
“viewed as a practical, realistic matter, the rescued people
were unable to leave the ship that rescued them...” (para-
graph 80). However, the Court was not called upon to
consider the operation of obligations that Australia may
owe under international treaties such as the ICCPR or the
Refugees Convention.
228. H. Esmaeili & B. Wells, “The ‘Temporary’ Refugees: Aus-
tralia’s Legal Response to the Arrival of Iraqi and Afghan
Boat-People” (2000) 23(3) UNSW L.J. 224–45 at 235–36.
229. Such as Refugee Convention, Articles 26, 28, 31, etc.
230. HREOC, supra note 100.
231. Australia has implemented certain provisions of the Refu-
gees Convention into domestic law by reference via the
Migration Act, s.36(1): see MIMA v. Thiyagarajah (1997)
151 ALR 685 at 697. Just what parts of the Convention
are directly incorporated into domestic law is a matter of
some discussion. While Australia is a signatory to the
Convention and Protocol, it has not enacted every part of
the Convention into domestic law, thereby giving rise to
enforceable rights. It would appear that the central obli-
gations are those contained in Articles 32 and 33 (against
non-refoulement and expulsion of refugees) and the defi-
nition and exclusion clauses contained in Article 1 of the
Convention. MIMA v. Thiyagarajah (1997) 151 ALR 685
at 697–98; see also MIMA v. Ibrahim [2000] HCA 55 per
Gummow J paras 107–109–136 who referred to these
duties as ones being owed to refugees. See also MIMA v.
Khawar [2002] HCA 14 (11 April 2002) at paras. 45 and
46 per McHugh and Gummow JJ; online: AusTLII
Homepage <http://www.austlii.edu.au/>. See Esmaeili &
Wells, supra note 228 at 228–29.
232. CAT, Article 3: “1. No State Party shall expel, return
(“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.”
233. HREOC, supra note 196. Also Human Rights Watch,
supra note 8 at 12; Esmaeili & Wells, supra note 228 at
238–39.
234. Human Rights Watch, supra note 8 at 165.
235. HREOC, supra note 196.
236. CROC Articles 2, 3, 30, 22, 37, and 39.
237. UNHCR, supra note 199, Guideline 5.
238. HREOC, supra note 167.
239. Supra notes 5 and 126.
240. DIMIA, Response to the Human Rights Commissioner’s
July 2000 Review of Curtin IRPC (15 December 2000);
online: HREOC Homepage <<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/
Australia’s Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers

word/human_rights/ asylum_seekers/DIMA_response.doc>>
(date accessed: 21 February 2002).
241. Press information page, Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock
MP, supra note 85.
242. HREOC, supra note 167.
243. For a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of these issues, see
M. Crock, “A Sanctuary Under Review: Where to From Here
for Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program ?” (2000)
23(3) UNSW L.J 246–87.
244. HREOC, supra note 85 at 12; and also ROC, “Alternative Deten-
tion Model”; online: ROC Homepage <http://www.refugee-
council.org.au> (date accessed: 22 February 2002).
245. DIMIA, supra note 239.
246. DIMIA, Fact Sheet 70, supra note 123.
247. An uncomfortable use of words, since it so clearly resonates with
another type of “solution” implemented by another regime in
the middle of last century.
248. HREOC, supra note 85 at 12: “ The convergence of border
control on the one hand and protection obligations under the
Refugee Convention and Protocol on the other gives rise to
policies of mandatory detention as a deterrent. The impact of
this convergence is disproportionately felt by asylum seekers
who arrive by boat and claim refugee status on-shore. Some may
be illegal immigrants and some refugees. On the surface, how-
ever, they are often indistinguishable and are treated as such.”
249. Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock MP, supra note 161;
Phillips, supra note 89 at 289 and fn7.
250. The notion of “queue jumping” or “forum shopping” is not
entirely new in Australian domestic politics. In 1979, a Sydney
newspaper, the Daily Telegraph, in its editorial of 8 January
1979, noting Australia’s offer to take 10,500 “properly proc-
essed” refugees by June 1979 from camps in Malaysia then
holding 500,000 people, commented: “it would be unfair to
them if a substantial part of this quota was made up of refugees
who have sailed directly here”: Johnson, supra note 21 at 14.
251. Implicitly differentiating between “deserving” and “undeserv-
ing” refugee applicants.
252. Let’s be clear, incarcerating anyone without recourse to the
courts is a punishment.
253. Since the government strengthened its mandatory policy by
introducing expulsion of asylum seekers following the Tampa
incident, it claims that these “policies of deterrence” are work-
ing, in that the number of boat arrivals has dropped. This
conveniently ignores the fact that since the policy’s introduction
in November 2001, the monsoon season, which extends from
November to February, is unsuitable and highly dangerous to
open sea crossings. Indeed, the initial upsurge in unauthorized
arrivals in August/September 2001 at the time following the
Tampa incident was probably more indicative of people wishing
to make the crossing to Australia before the commencement of
the wet season than a measure of the success or failure of the
government’s policy. For negative characterizations of asylum
seekers, see D. Corlett, “Politics, Symbolism and the Asy-
lum Seeker Issue” (2000) 23(3) UNSW  L.J 13–28  at
19–20.
254. It makes no sense that Al Qaeda or any terrorist group
would spend time and money to train a potential terrorist
merely to put them on a leaking boat in the Indian Ocean
in the hope that they may arrive in Australia in order to
end up in a detention centre, possibly for years on end.
The sad irony is that all the suspects in the attacks in New
York were by all reports well dressed, well educated young
men with money, passports, and regular documentation
– meaning that they had in fact been granted visas and
immigration-cleared to enter the U.S. This is not the type
of person usually found on a boat off the coast of Australia
seeking asylum.
255. The government even claimed to have found terrorists
among purported asylum seekers, this not so much refers
to those who may pose a genuine security risk to the
Australian community, but are alleged to have been in-
volved in terrorist or criminal actions overseas. While it
may be desirable to detain such people in detention, this
does not serve as justification to keep all asylum seekers
in detention.
256. Esmaeili & Wells, supra note 228 at 229.
257. For example, at the Australian embassy in Nairobi, Kenya,
there are two and half Australian staff members, with
responsibility for processing applications from thirty-
four countries in Africa. Only around half of Australian
representative posts  overseas  have  Migration Depart-
ment offices. There are usually around 10,000 visa places
reserved in the yearly migration quotas for the refugee,
humanitarian, and special assistance categories.  Only
Principal and Senior Migration officers and other Austra-
lian Immigration Department officers can process such
visas: S. Dunbar, “The Myth of the Off-Shore Refugee
Queue: The Reality  of  Despair”  (2000) 9(1) Human
Rights Defender at 20–21.
258. Ibid. at 20–21.
259. Supra note 253.
260. The government’s response is that it is up to critics to state
when the problem does become significant, pointing to
the vast numbers of asylum seekers that beset other in-
dustrialized countries: Immigration Minister, Philip
Ruddock MP, supra note 18 at 4.
261. DIMIA, supra note 2 at 8: “There is currently no intention
to end the policy of mandatory detention of unauthorised
arrivals, which has bipartisan support in Parliament.”
262. N. Poynder, “The Incommunicado Detention of Boat
People: A Recent Development in Australia’s Refugee
Policy” (1997) 3(2) AJHR 53 at 63.
263. S. Pickering, “The hard press of asylum” (2000) 8 Forced
Migration Review 32; R. McGregor, “Minister Warns of
Boatpeople Flood” The Australian (16 November 1999) 1.
Volume 20 Refuge Number 3

264. Esmaeili & Wells, supra note 228 at 237–38; RCOA, supra note
117 at 59.
265. Einfeld, supra note 5 at 308.
266. Ibid. at 308.
Francesco Motta [BA(Hons) MPhil, LLB, MIL] is a solicitor
working in the area of international human rights law and has
just completed co-writing a book on Refugee Law in Australia,
due for publication in 2002. He was an adviser to a former
Minister of Immigration, the Hon. Sen. Bolkus, and was a Mem-
ber of the Refugee Review Tribunal.
Australia’s Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers

